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M. N. Roy



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PREFACE

An analysis of the long correspondence between the Viceroy and Gandhi on the latter's release from jail in the middle of last year, eventually, covered a much wider ground. It is now published in the form of this book. Though originally written as a series of essays on the different facets of nationalism, an analysis of the concept of freedom is the central theme of the book. On other occasions, I have written extensively on the economic and political aspects of nationalism. The analysis contained in the book is very largely from the cultural point of view. After everything is said by way of an explanation of the curious patterns and colourful personalities of Indian nationalism, there still remain certain very striking features which cannot be rationally explained. They come under the purview of psycho-analysis, and therefore, should be treated as psycho-analytical problems. I have done so. "A Psycho-Analysis of Indian Nationalism, with special reference to its two most outstanding leaders."—might therefore be a fitting sub-title of the book.

Events which have taken place since these essays were written, seem to corroborate the result of my analysis. That is my opinion, which may not yet be shared by many. But none would suggest that the democracy of counting heads could ever be valid for the realm of thought. To test truth by a majority vote would be an absurdity. It is not maintained that what I say is true. My contention is that, if a gathering of fifty thousand people could be hypnotised so as to pronounce seeing the sun rise at midnight, that could not be accepted as truth, and an entire people can be placed in a state of mass hysteria. If we do not see what is happening under our very nose, we must, in the fulness of time, thank ourselves for what is in store for us.

The book went to the press in the beginning of this year. This inordinate delay in its reaching the public is said to be due to war-time difficulties.

Dehradun,
Dec 15th 1945

M. N. Roy

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CHAPTER I

THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE

The long-winded controversy between Gandhi and the Government was entirely pointless as regards the vital issue of our time, vital not only for our country, but for the whole world. The issue is the problem of freedom. It was entirely missed in the controversy, by both the parties. As a matter of fact, it is deliberately brushed aside from both sides.

What would have happened if the Government had acted as Gandhi held it should have done? That is the fundamental question. Far from answering it, Gandhi did not even raise the question. It is natural for him to shirk this crucial question, because he cannot give an answer different from the one he gave at the end of 1942. At that time, he admitted that enforcement of the Quit-India resolution might plunge India into a chaos, and he was prepared to take that risk. But the Government also does not think it necessary to put him down to the vital question, his answer to which is already recorded in history. They also are concerned with superficial technicalities. They would be satisfied if Gandhi admits that he committed a serious error of judgment, and revokes the August resolution. That, however, would be a superficial settlement, which would not touch the fundamental issue.

Would India be free if the British Government had quitted the country, leaving the Congress in charge of the resulting chaos? Or would the danger, which threatened Indian freedom by the possible chaos at the end of 1942, be removed if the Congress to-day revoked the August resolution and co-operated with the Government?

These are the two vital questions : One regarding the past and the other about the future. There is a logical connection between the two questions. The answer to one would determine the answer to the other. But there is still another question, the answer to which would help an intelligent approach to the problem of Indian freedom. The

question is : Why did the Congress act as it did in a critical moment? Whatever might have been the motive, a series of acts were committed. The possible consequence of those acts would not be according to the motive, if the latter did not approve of their logic.

Gandhi's casuistry about the August resolution and the sabotage movement does not answer these questions. Nor is it of any importance now to discuss those events. They are mere episodes of past history, significant only as symptoms of a deep-seated disease—expressions of an underlying conflict. It was not, nor is it a conflict between a foreign government and the people's urge for freedom. It was not a question of co-operation or non-co-operation with war efforts. It was, and it still is, a conflict between urge for freedom and fear of freedom. The relation between the Congress and the Government did not, does not to-day, coincide with the fundamental conflict of the Indian situation. The whole controversy, therefore, misses the point, and is utterly useless for the solution of the problem of freedom. By side-tracking the fundamental issue, it only prejudices the future of the Indian people.

In view of what Gandhi and other Congress leaders said and wrote two years ago and earlier, arguments advanced in his correspondence with the Viceroy appear to be sheer casuistry. But it is very difficult for many, even among his critics and opponents, to suspect Gandhi of dishonesty or prevarication, which are the essential features of casuistry. The contradiction, however, can be easily explained. Gandhi need not be suspected of dishonesty. No neurotic person ever is ; and neurosis is the psychological foundation of demonstrative saintliness. It is an observed psychological phenomenon that neurotic persons, even if they are subjectively sincere, are often driven unconsciously by motives which are contradictory to what they believe to be their motives; they attempt to harmonise the contradictions of their own feelings, their emotional conflicts, by ideological constructions or fallacious moralisings, without ever doubting their moral integrity. Gandhi's casuistry, therefore, could be explained only in the light of the understanding of the operation of the subconscious mind. This understanding has taught psychologists to be skeptical about words, even of saints, and not to take them at their face-value.

An insight into the personality of Gandhi, his character structure, is indispensable for a proper understanding of his efforts to confuse issues. Let it be also understood that they are not rational efforts, made with a conscious purpose; they are motivated by subconscious urges. The urges have been driven into the darkness of the subconscious mind and sublimated, because essentially they represent a fear of freedom. Yet, Gandhi claims to be the personification of the urge for freedom of the Indian people, and is acclaimed as such. That is the basic contradiction which confuses the epoch-making issue of contemporary Indian history—the problem of freedom.

Though this issue presented itself in a sharp relief in the context of the controversy, not of words, but of deeds, about India's relation to this war, it had been before the country for nearly two decades previously. Very few noticed it. Social forces gathering on the political arena as an amorphous mass were not conscious and differentiated enough to join the issue. A mass psychology was created by confused, chaotic, social environments—partially static, galvanising cultural traditionalism, partially in the process of disintegration. A conflict, between the urge for freedom, still largely unconscious, and fear of freedom is the characteristic feature of such a transitional mass psychology. Therefore, every revolutionary crisis is also a counter-revolutionary crisis. Other things being equal, the chances are fifty-fifty. But the dialectics of history is never so very impartial as to make the other things equal. In every social crisis, the dice are loaded against the forces of progress. As against the future, the past always has the great weightage of death. The greatest enemy of freedom is the fear of freedom, and in any transitional period of history, the fear of freedom is the acuter, the greater is the degree of relative freedom already attained. Relative freedom, that is, freedom *from* certain restrictions or inhibitions, but not yet positive freedom *to* accelerate the liberating process of social and cultural evolution, means loss of old mooring—social as well as cultural. It creates a feeling of lonesomeness and isolation. The prospect of freedom from the past may be welcome; but the fear of the uncertainty of the future, at the same time, encourages atavism. That is how is created a psychological atmosphere congenial for the rise of authoritarianism, which is a negation of the urge for freedom, although often it gets the stranglehold on mass psychology by means of sublimation—by

making the negation of freedom appear as the struggle for freedom; not only making it so appear, but actually believing the fraud to be an honest performance with the highest of motives.

The conflict between the urge for freedom and the fear of freedom was the issue before the entire civilised world ever since the last war. The issue was finally joined in this war. India, being a part of the civilised world, could not avoid the issue of our time. On the other hand, it being the fundamental issue of contemporary history, it had its roots in the social conditions and cultural atmosphere of each country. Only it was sharper or confused, according to the degree of the differentiation of social forces, and the cultural state of each country. India being backward in this respect, the issue was so very greatly confused that the operation of the fear of freedom could appear as the conscious urge for freedom; that authoritarianism incorporating the negation of freedom could claim to be, and was hailed as, the champion of freedom.

Notwithstanding Gandhi's casuistry about his (he and the Congress are identical) attitude towards the Axis Powers and Fascism, it is a fact, evident to all critical students of contemporary history, that with his advent, authoritarianism became the fundamental principle of Indian Nationalism. While preaching revolt against the temporal power—only of the British Government (not of the native privileged classes)—he demanded submission to a spiritual authority. The religiosity of Gandhi is the psychological mainstay of authoritarianism. There have been other such instances in history.

Critical historians and students of social psychology are still to teach the world to what extent the urge for freedom expressed by the Renaissance movement was counter-acted by the fear of freedom represented by the Reformation, and thus laid down the cultural foundation for the rise of authoritarianism in a subsequent epoch. When it is realised that Luther and Calvin, though revolting against the Catholic Church, laid the psychological foundation of a political authoritarianism, one should not be shocked by the discovery that Gandhi played the same reactionary role in India. And his role has been all the more reactionary because it was played in the setting of social conditions and cultural environments much more backward than those of Europe in the seventeenth century.

Apparently, Gandhi preaches not submission to God, but love of God. The love, however, is to be demonstrated through self-effacement, humiliation, suffering and sacrifice. If love is self-effacement, the equation is clear for the critic : Love is equal to submission to a superhuman authority, demonstrated through unreserved faith, is the only means for man to acquire power which will bring him freedom. Only through prayer can man demonstrate his love for God and share in God's glory which gives him power. Prayer is an action of helplessness, which results from the absence of power. Man must realise his absolute powerlessness to have the power to be free! Evidently, he can have it only by the grace of God, which comes through the intermediary of the saint or the leader, who has opened up the hope before the hungry vision of devotees or followers weighed down with the feeling of powerlessness and helplessness. Unconditional submission is the condition for salvation—and also for power. That is the appeal of authoritarianism—to the mass psychology dominated by the fear of freedom. That is also the essence of Gandhism.

The influence of any doctrine is proportionate to the degree in which it appeals to the psychic needs of those to whom it is preached. In other words, there is a large element of historical truth in the saying that a people gets the kind of leader it deserves. Only, it is not a matter of conscious desire, but of an automatic conformity with sub-conscious cultural urges. The personality of the leader, his conscious behaviour—physical as well as mental, including emotional—is determined by the given social environment and the cultural background, which are equally operative for the entire human group of which he is an individual member. An authoritarian leadership can be established only when there is a mass psychology of predisposition towards submission. That psychological trait results from powerlessness and helplessness, or from a feeling of uncertainty about what may be in store in a dimly dawning future as against the security of conservatism and tradition. This feeling can be called fear of freedom.

The last war brought about a degree of unsettlement in the traditional patterns of Indian society and habits. Previously, the masses had regarded the Government as 'Ma-Bap'. Experience during the war shook that faith which was the moral sanction for law and order. The masses were moved by a vague feeling of revolt. They

could not as yet think in terms of freedom. Nevertheless, the vague dissatisfaction against the traditional conditions of life did create in them a subconscious urge to be free from those conditions. That unconscious urge created a fear complex in them. How could they live if the context of their very existence—the traditional setting or their being and becoming—disappeared? The incipient urge for freedom was overwhelmed by the fear of freedom—a feeling which grows rankly in the atmosphere of a mediaeval culture which made no room for the concept of individual freedom. The central theme of that culture was submission of man—either to the will of God or to his own '*karma*'. Culturally, the Indian masses were thus predisposed to authoritarianism; the mass psychology was of authoritarianism. In the critical moment, they created a leader accordingly—one who could sublimate the fear of freedom as striving for freedom, which was to be had through the means of power to be derived from complete submission to a super-human authority.

The social basis of Gandhian authoritarianism, however, was provided by the urban middle-class which felt the social crisis to some extent consciously. The urban middle-class had not yet broken its connection with the agrarian economy of the country. The stagnation of agriculture and pauperisation of the peasantry adversely affected the economic position of the urban middle-class. It therefore felt that there was something wrong in the situation, which should be repaired. Yet another element of insecurity entered the experience of the urban middle-class. It was the insecurity, indeed growing scarcity, of employment.

The middle-class had grown up as an adjunct to the State apparatus—with the function to man the governmental machinery. That kind of employment had reached the saturation point and new employment suitable for the middle-class had not been created. A social tie broke—the one between the urban middle-class and the Government. The former felt without any mooring. The old tie was gone, but there was no future. The conviction that man, by collective action, could make his own destiny was lacking. There was a search for an authority—a power to rely upon. Modern education, and economic position at least partially outside the traditional patterns of the social organisation, and the consequent new setting of life, had meant for the urban middle-class a slight advance towards the

concept of individual freedom. But freedom meant further isolation from old moorings and drifting away from traditions which offered a sense of cultural solidarity, and therefore a general security, as against the dim hopes held out by an uncertain future. Fear of freedom was the natural psychological reaction experienced by the urban middle-class.

Gandhi was a typical member of this class which constituted the social basis of authoritarianism. His autobiography records innumerable evidences of the feeling of lonesomeness. The sojourn in Britain, strange experiences there, the practice of legal profession in South Africa—all that made him feel isolated from the old social organisation and cultural moorings which appeared to have offered greater security to the individual. But he could not retrace his steps. Lonesomeness and helplessness created in him the neurosis of masochism—the desire to give up the independence of one's individual self and to fuse one's self with something outside, in order to acquire the strength to face life. The faith in God and reliance on His love are the result of the sense of powerlessness and helplessness. The new mooring was found in submission to a supernatural authority; suffering and sacrifice were the expressions of submission. The lonesome individual, frightened by the spectre of freedom, found refuge in submission to an authority, and on that token became the preacher of the doctrine that self-effacement, humiliation, suffering and sacrifice were the only source of power.

Power, which is to be derived from a negation of freedom cannot logically attain freedom. Gandhism, therefore, is negation of freedom. The fear of freedom created Fascism in Europe. The psychological basis of Gandhist nationalism being also fear or negation of freedom, it has a cultural affinity with Fascism. That is the background of the problem of freedom for India, which is the fundamental issue of our time. No useful purpose will be served by side-tracking the issue.

Deliberate confusion may help defeated Indian Fascism to regroup its forces, but it will do so only with the purpose of returning to the offensive at the earliest available opportunity. The Government may be indifferent to that danger. But those for whom freedom is neither a racial concept nor a mere word, cannot allow either Gandhist casuistry or opportunism of a demoralised government to confuse the issue concerning the future of the country.

CHAPTER II

NEGATION OF FREEDOM

The conclusion derived (in the last chapter) from a scientific analysis of the cultural background and psychological content of Gandhist nationalism, is corroborated by facts. No amount of casuistry, no ideological constructions, can eliminate facts recorded in history. Whether Congress nationalism or Gandhi personally was pro-Japanese is a question which has ceased to be of any importance now. No useful purpose will be served by discussing that question, a clear answer to which has been recorded also by history. Any discussion of this pointless question now only side-tracks the real issue, begs the vital questions : What is the relation between Nationalism and Fascism, and if there is any reason to assume that, upon a possible settlement of the dispute between the Congress and the Government, will that relation cease to operate ?

The nearing end of the war, the imminent defeat of the Axis Powers, does not push this question into past history. The Congress attitude towards India's relation to the war against the Fascist Powers will be an antiquated issue as soon as the war will be over. Already it has become so, for all practical purposes. But that attitude was only a manifestation of the relation between Nationalism and Fascism—of the ideas and ideals of nationalism. That relation is the underlying issue which is being side-tracked, from the one side by Gandhi asserting that the Congress was always willing to co-operate in the prosecution of the war against the Axis Powers, and from the other side by the Government repeatedly denying that they ever suspected Congress of being pro-Japanese.

Fascism is not an attractive and powerful machine made in Germany, primarily for home consumption and also to be dumped abroad on unwilling customers. It is a world-historical phenomenon, the spectre of which not only gravely endangered the present, but

cast an ominous shadow on the future of entire humanity. Social conditions, cultural clichés and psychological problems, which gave birth to the monster, were to be found, and are still in operation, in differently woven patterns throughout the world.

In countries where the liberating forces of modern civilisation went farther in their operation, relative freedom was attained in varying degrees. The measure was the social position of the individual, not as an atomised entity, but as an integral part of a collectivity held together with mutual co-operation in productive work, including the creativeness of intellect and emotion. India has not experienced any advance towards that ideal of freedom. The first feeble and faltering efforts made in the closing decades of the nineteenth century were presently counter-acted by religious and cultural revivalist movements which eventually merged into the powerful current of nationalism.

Gandhi appeared on the Indian political scene, unfolding on a cultural background characterised by authoritarian mass psychology, just when Fascism was raising its head in Europe. That was not a mere chronological coincidence. It is the task of critical historians to unearth the connection between Gandhist tirades against Western civilisation and Fascist negation of democracy, rationalism and liberal traditions. The sum total of these latter is the positive outcome of modern civilisation. A negative attitude towards modern civilisation, like that of Gandhi, is therefore a negation of the social and cultural values which lay down the foundation of freedom. Gandhism and Fascism are both essentially opposed to the same enemy. If the latter is a negation of freedom already established, the former expresses fear of the modern concept of freedom, and fear is a negative attitude.

Fascism also preaches the sublime doctrine of "suffering and sacrifice"—a doctrine which reduces man to nothingness. Unconditional submission of the individual is the psychological mainstay of, and moral sanction for, authoritarianism, no matter whether the authority demanding submission is secular or spiritual—whether it is the State personified by the Leader, or God making His will manifest through the inner voice of a Mahatma. Physical violence is necessary to destroy political and cultural structure which may harbour the ideal of freedom even in the midst of a mass flight from

it. Distrust and fear against the concept of modern freedom will be fomented by moral coercion exercised through spiritual authoritarianism. In the case of a country which has not yet experienced freedom, in the sense of spiritual liberation and cultural autonomy of the individual, even partially, the distrust and fear against the modern concept of freedom can be very easily promoted by appealing to the ignorance, superstitions and conservatism of the masses. The purpose of Fascism is served. Any doctrine, movement or organisation which is instrumental in this respect, is an instrument of Fascism. Any such doctrine is, essentially as well as pragmatically, Fascist.

That is the relation between Gandhist Nationalism and Fascism. It is a historical relation; it is also a relation of cultural affinity. Nationalism is static Fascism, the latter being dynamic social and cultural reaction. Gandhism would not allow man to aspire for freedom; Fascism would compel him to sacrifice it. Both idealise negation of freedom as the escape from the tyranny of modern civilisation, which breaks up man's mediaeval moorings (of a false security of submission), but gives him the opportunity to steer himself through the uncharted sea of a period of social and cultural transition, to the harbour of real security guaranteed by a purposeful integration and voluntary co-operation of free individuals.

We shall revert to this searching analysis of the cultural and historic relation, conscious as well as subconscious, between Gandhist nationalism and Fascism. What has already been revealed, is enough to set in clear relief the issue underlying the present political conflict, an issue which must be joined if the correct approach to the problem of freedom for the people of India is to be found, if freedom is not to be a fraud, if all this casuistry, on the one hand, and constitutional pretensions, on the other, is not to serve the purpose of helping Fascism triumph in India, even when it will suffer a setback in other parts of the world.

Now, in order to drive the point home, let us recollect some of the most memorable (not to be forgotten) facts of recent history.

In his autobiography, Jawaharlal Nehru testifies to the existence of Fascist sympathies among Congressmen. He does not reveal the facts which caused the apprehension. A number of them, however,

were publicly known. There were leading Congressmen who did not make any secret of their sympathy for Fascism;—some even went to the extent of approving of the Fascist aggression against weaker peoples. The General Secretary of the Congress himself publicly rebuked the leftist followers of Nehru, and by implication Nehru himself, for their quixotic advocacy for Abyssinia against a powerful country like Italy. On the same occasion, he argued that to annoy great Powers was not in the interest of Indian nationalism. Logically, the same argument would hold good in the case of Japan's aggression against China.

Generally, Nehru's socialism and concern for the fate of the victims of Fascist aggression were a subject of ridicule among the more powerful leaders of the Congress who did not make any secret of their admiration for "great men" like Hitler and Mussolini; they also believed that India needed "national unity" (totalitarianism) on the pattern of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. There is no reason to assume that they do not entertain the belief even to-day. Indeed, they are more likely to believe that the overthrow of the "great men" regimes will be a calamity for Germany and Italy.

During the years preceding the outbreak of the war, several Congress and other nationalist leaders visited Germany and Italy. Some were received in audience, if not in every case by the Leader, but by Deputy Leaders. On return, they made public speeches and wrote articles in the press extolling the "great achievements" of Italy and Germany under the Fascist regime. They waxed eloquent about how Hitler and Mussolini had again made their respective nations great Powers. The admiration for Hitler and Mussolini and for the ideas and ideals they stood for, was wide-spread among Congressmen. Fascism was regarded as the fullest expression of nationalism, and as such naturally captivated the imagination and commanded the sympathy of nationalists, proud of cultural traditionalism and, therefore, willing victims of the authoritarian psychology.

As a matter of fact, the Fascist cult of Aryanism and Hitler's denunciation of Marxist materialism were acclaimed by the average nationalist as a vindication of ancient Indian culture—as a triumph of Eastern Spiritualism over Western Materialism. It was a cherished

belief among nationalists that the doctrines of Fascism were formulated by great German Sanskrit scholars, who had drunk deep in the wisdom of the *Vedas*.

Powerful Congressmen who controlled the machinery of the organisation, either locally or provincially or on the national scale, actually proposed to build up the party on the model of the Nazis. Mussolini's Black Shirts and Hitler's Storm Troopers fired the imagination and quickened the subconscious sadism of the frustrated lower middle-class youth. Semi-military organisations, actuated with the spirit (rather lack of spirit) of submission to the Leader, became very popular. Some of those organisations are still in existence.

Gandhi may believe that he is telling the truth when he asks the world to believe that the Congress never wished the victory of the Fascist Powers. The fact, however, is that even to-day most Congressmen and nationalists generally do not believe that Germany or Japan can be beaten. Until the tide of military events turned in favour of the United Nations, the news of every Axis victory was welcomed by the average nationalist as a victory of his cause. There could not be any doubt about the object of his sympathy, and the sympathy resulted from the cultural affinity between Fascism and nationalism—the identity of the ideas and ideals of both. That is not an opportunist relation which could change with the change of circumstances. The form of the expression of this relation may have to be modified. When the defeat of the Axis Powers is certain, opposition to India's participation in the war against them is no longer a wise political tactics. Why not, then, make a virtue of necessity and proclaim a fervent desire to help the winning cause? That may be altogether a political stratagem, and as such may deceive those who by conviction never belonged to the other camp in the international civil war, although they could not but oppose the Congress when it tried to overthrow them. But political opportunism, or even a belated wisdom on the part of some Congress leaders (granted that Gandhi's correspondence indicates such a change of heart) cannot change a wide-spread sentiment deeply rooted in a cultural and historical background, operating as a fixation of mass psychology. That is the fundamental issue. Therefore, even if Gandhi's apologia was accepted, and the conflict between the Congress and

the Government ended on that basis, nationalism would operate as a negation of freedom; Fascism would triumph in India.

The relation between Fascism and Gandhist nationalism is determined by the common opposition to the cultural (actual and potential) implications of modern civilisation. That relation, in its turn, predetermined the Congress attitude towards the war against the Axis Powers. The Congress, and generally the nationalist, attitude towards the war was consistent with the convictions of nationalism. Gandhi's defence, therefore, has no force unless it is a denial of nationalism. The revocation of the August resolution may end the quarrel between the Government and the Congress. Consequently, power may be transferred to penitent sinners. Erstwhile rebels may be invited to positions of power after unconditional surrender. But the leopard won't change its spots. The issue between freedom and Fascism will be settled in favour of the latter. Gandhi's casuistry is a strategic retreat—the wisdom of stooping to conquer. This possible victory of nationalism will be a grave danger to Indian freedom. The question of the moment is if even a remote possibility of freedom can be reconciled with the perspective of triumphant Fascism.

CHAPTER III

THE LOGIC OF HISTORY

In Europe, Fascism represents a reaction to the negative features of the capitalist civilisation, namely, lonesomeness and helplessness of the individual, resulting from his atomisation. These features are accentuated in the period where the progressive potentialities of capitalist economy are exhausted, and monopolist capitalism increases the degree of social insecurity, particularly for the middle and lower classes. In that period, the reaction becomes more violent, and the cultural sanctions of the capitalist civilisation—humanism, rationalism and liberalism—are assaulted.

But the antidote to the evils of capitalism also generates within its own organism. As against the dawning perspective of a social and cultural integration of the atomised individual in a new pattern of freedom, Fascism idealises mediaeval values and mythical traditions. Things which have been, or are believed to have been, are more appealing to the unthinking than things expected to be. The past is a reality, because it has been experienced or believed to have been experienced; the future is only a matter of imagination or supposition. A journey back to the past inspires confidence, to the future, it is an adventure. Therefore, the Fascist appeal is so very irresistible in the atmosphere of insecurity aggravated by the ruthless operation of monopolist capital. The middle-class and the backward masses eagerly respond to the appeal. Because, for them, the present is intolerable, and their social and cultural vision being circumscribed by conservatism, their place in society and ignorance, they cannot look into the future for hope. Only those engaged in productive occupations can do that. Because, their collective experience, together with the experience of there like throughout history, gives them the convention that there is a future, and that they can shape it by collective effort.

The last war plunged Europe in a gigantic social conflict between the forces of reaction and the forces of progress. The former gathered strength, holding out the promise to lead the distressed and disillusioned back to the security of an idealised past. They could overwhelm the forces of progress not because of any inherent weakness on the part of the latter. The latter's appeal to reason would have eventually prevailed over the psychological predisposition of the culturally backward masses, had the forces of reaction not been armed with other advantages to make the best of the fundamental asset of an authoritarian social psychology.

The unstable equilibrium of capitalist society was bound to tip over to the direction of the atomised individual, with his freedom of a doubtful value finding security in the new pattern of freedom in a collective existence. That perspective of socialism replacing the exhausted capitalist order could be blurred by tilting the scale to the opposite direction of abolishing individual freedom in the context of capitalist society, which meant permanent insecurity, fear and helplessness. Capitalist society could no longer offer any security to the great bulk of the people. There was the danger of their being attracted by the adventures of a promising future. The danger was headed off by the counter-attraction of a tried security of the past. As the danger was really a danger only for the ruling class (monopoly capitalism) the whole weight of their privileged position was thrown into the scale to press it down on the wrong side. Not only were vast financial resources placed at the disposal of Fascism; but the entire apparatus of the capitalist State, which was still formally democratic, helped Fascism to overwhelm the forces of progress even before it came to power.

The psychological predisposition to a flight from freedom, which is the basic social and cultural asset of Fascism, alone would not guarantee its triumph, but for the above auxiliary advantages. Therefore, Fascism has been defined as the politics of monopolist capitalism. It is more than politics; it is the ideology of monopolist capitalism. When capitalism can no longer operate as a socially liberating and culturally progressive force, then its very existence depends on the triumph of cultural atavism and social revivalism. Fascism incorporates these reactionary tendencies.

In India, nationalism has been developing on a background of the interplay of analogous social forces and cultural tendencies. Capitalism is the power behind the Gandhist Congress. This relation between nationalism and capitalism has become more and more evident in course of time. The unfolding of this social relation underlying the nationalist movement under the leadership of a superman, reached its point of culmination on the publication of the Tata-Birla plan, and its enthusiastic endorsement by all shades of nationalist opinion. The relation was very correctly depicted in a cartoon in a leading Congress press organ : The plan in the form of a new-born babe was carried by its authors (all big businessmen) to the shrine of the Mahatma; the caption of the cartoon was : "Wanted a god-father."

The Tata-Birla plan is the programme of monopolist capitalism. As such, it is the programme of Indian Fascism. Since it requires the blessing of the High priest of nationalism, Gandhist nationalism is exposed as Fascism.

Irrespective of what may be said for or against it, the Tata-Birla plan is admittedly a plan of monopolist capitalism. It frankly postulates eclipse of individual liberty and freedom of enterprise as the conditions for its execution. Abolition of individual liberty, that is, political democracy, and of the freedom of enterprise, that is, competitive economy, is the hall-mark of monopoly capitalism. Indeed, only in its monopolist stage, can capitalist production be planned. The purpose of capitalist planning is to eliminate competition.

The philosophical doctrine of individualism and political democracy are the moral and social sanctions for the freedom of enterprise and competition in the economic field; which, in their turn, are the characteristic features of capitalism so long as it operates as a progressive force. By its own admission, (in the Tata-Birla Plan) capitalism, which is the power behind Indian nationalism, cannot operate as a progressive force. It cannot find its moral and social sanction in rationalism, individualism and liberalism. It must seek its moral sanction in cultural atavism in the authoritarian tradition of the mediaeval society and in the idealised values of a legendary past. Therefore, Fascism, is bound to be its ideology. That is the cause of the spiritual affinity between Gandhist nationalism and Fascism.

The sophistry of pseudo-Marxists or falsification of Marxism cannot compel Indian capitalism to be progressive, and, on that token, attach a revolutionary role to nationalism. The progressive significance of capitalism results from its doctrine of the freedom of enterprise. This fundamental doctrine of capitalist economy, in its turn, postulates individualism and dissolution of mediaeval society which allow no freedom to the individual.

Freedom of enterprise, that is, competitive economy, could be confined to national boundaries only before the development of the world market. Competition in the world market (the home market is a part of the world market) necessitates progressive curbing of the freedom of enterprise within national boundaries. The keener the competition in the world market, the lesser is the freedom of enterprise at home. Unless competition is eliminated at home, a capitalist country cannot compete successfully in the world market.

The development of capitalism has abolished national markets. They cannot be demarcated even by the highest tariff walls. All countries producing on the basis of capitalist economy must compete in one single and the same world market. Capitalism throughout the world has, by the logic of its own development, entered the stage of monopoly. If in any single country capitalism tries to be out of step, and function in its pristine purity, to oblige subjective theoreticians, it will commit suicide. Indian capitalism cannot be expected to do so. On the contrary, it proposes to adopt monopolist practice to the fullest measure, as evidenced by the Tata-Birla Plan.

The politics of monopolist capitalism in India also must be Fascism. So long as nationalism remains associated with monopolist capital, it cannot be anything but Fascism. Indeed, nationalism is the professed politics of Indian capitalism. Therefore, nationalism is Fascism. That is the logic of history.

CHAPTER IV

PSYCHOANALYSIS OF GANDHISM

Passionate condemnation of violence in any form is apparently, as well as ostensibly, the essence of Gandhism. In contrast to that, Fascism makes a cult of violence. Is it, then, not absurd to hold that there is any affinity between two such antithetical doctrines?

Before proceeding to answer this apparently crushing question, one or two preliminary observations may be made. The exposure of the affinity between Gandhism and Fascism does not imply any doubt about the sincerity of the prophet of the former as regards his profession of non-violence. Fanaticism, indeed, is the highest expression of sincerity. But fanaticism, at the same time, being a highly irrational emotional state, cannot be taken as the conclusive evidence of the rationality of the cult. However, Fascism, as commonly understood, is not directly equated with Gandhism. The direct relation is between Fascism and Nationalism. Nationalism cannot disown this relation without denying itself. Because Fascism is Nationalism. On the other hand, Gandhism is the accepted ideology of Indian Nationalism. That is the relation between Gandhism and Fascism. It is not an accidental relation. There was a time when Nationalism, generally, was a progressive, liberating force. Gandhism is the antithesis of such kind of Nationalism. Gandhism supplies moral sanction to Nationalism, where it has become a reactionary force. Therefore, it is equated with Fascism.

Now let us take up the question raised in the beginning. Mere appearances give rise to it. Nevertheless, it has got to be answered, not only for disposing of the question, but also because, in answering it, we shall subject Gandhi's personality as well as his doctrines to a psychological analysis which will yield otherwise interesting results.

Meanwhile, let it be noted that the cultural affinity between Gandhism and Fascism, exposed by us, is not a logical deduction

from hypothetical premises; much less is it a dogmatic assertion. It is a matter of fact. Both Fascism and Gandhism represent negation of the modern concept of freedom, indeed, even of the ancient concept of freedom, as the spiritual as well as temporal autonomy of individuals in the context of a social and cultural pattern, making the being and becoming of such individuals possible.

Fascism is active negation of freedom—flight from freedom. Gandhism is passive negation—fear of freedom. This difference resulting from their respective historical (as distinct from chronological) contexts and actual politico-social environments, determines their antithetical appearances regarding the choice of means to the identical end. Fascism incites revolt against modern culture, including the concept of freedom; therefore, it must make a cult of violence. Gandhism discourages revolt against reactionary cultural traditions and mediaeval social relations which deprive man of spiritual as well as temporal freedom. Condemnation of violence serves the purpose of discouraging revolt.

Fascist violence is active, militant, reaction. Gandhist non-violence offers security to established reaction. The antithetical cults of violence and non-violence thus serve the self-same purpose.

Yes, it is a purpose, not an objective urge. Reaction has no objective validity; it is not necessary. In both the cases, with Fascism as well as Gandhism, negation of the modern concept of freedom is a deliberate preference. When the end is not objectively determined, but subjectively sought, any difference of means is morally immaterial. In that case, the possibility of the means influencing the end is excluded. Because, the means, also deliberately chosen, may either be a consciously opportunist choice, or determined by the psychological mechanism of escape. In the latter case, it is a moral justification of an immoral purpose, which is sublimated by the apparent morality of the means chosen for attaining it. In either case, the ethics of Gandhist non-violence is doubtful. A searching analysis will make that still more evident.

An exposition of the absurdity of the Gandhist doctrine of non-violence, taking it on its face value, will be the first reply to the question raised in the beginning of this chapter. If the doctrine itself is absurd, it cannot disprove the affinity between Gandhism and Fascism.

Violence is an expression of force or, to use a more scientific term, of energy. The latter is an integral component of the physical world in which man, with his soul, has his being and becoming. Indeed, modern physics reduces the entire physical existence to energy. How can, then, non-violence be the law of nature and life, as Gandhi holds dogmatically?

Life itself is a negation of the Gandhist doctrine of non-violence. Non-violence, in deed, speech and thought, is death. Yet, that is the ideal of Gandhism. Evidently, it is a utopia; indeed, even worse; it is a palpable absurdity. Utopia has an ontological as well as a logical validity. It is constructed out of imagination, on the basis of the world of experience. The Gandhist doctrine of non-violence has no such connection whatsoever. Therefore, it is an absurdity. It cannot be practised, not even by the prophet himself. Gandhi does not preach moderation of violence. His doctrine is absolutist.

The Gandhist doctrine of non-violence being so palpably absurd,—logically untenable, scientifically false, empirically impossible, pragmatically negative,—it should not be taken as the criterion for judging the social significance of Gandhisim. Indeed, this pseudo-moral cult serves the purpose of concealing the reactionary, and therefore immoral, essence of Gandhism. It has been constructed for the purpose.

In the context of a social organisation standing in an urgent need of a radical readjustment of the established relations and repudiation of cultural traditions providing moral sanction to those relations, the doctrine of non-violence means a taboo on the operation of the forces of progress. The necessary readjustment of social relations is not possible without doing some injury to what is called vested interests, spiritual as well as temporal. Even the most peaceful revolution does some harm to its opponents. Violence is committed of necessity. Operation of force is inherent in all physical and biological processes, and social evolution, after all, is a biological process; the soul also has a natural history. Therefore, absolute non-violence would rule out all social progress which, as any physical or biological movement, represents operation of energy. By placing absolute non-violence in its centre, Gandhism becomes the philosophy of social stagnation. The cult of non-violence provides moral sanction

for the negation of social liberation and cultural progress. Therefore, its ethics is doubtful; more than that : Gandhist non-violence is an immoral doctrine.

Is Gandhi, then, insincere? In a psychological analysis, the question is irrelevant. Human behaviour is determined by conscious motives only to a very small extent. Beyond that, the word sincerity is meaningless. It has no application to the vast realm of the subconscious mind, which primarily determines human action, character and personality. The fear of suspecting the sincerity of a palpably honest man disappears as soon as it is realised that the motives with which people believe themselves to be actuated are not necessarily the actual motives of their feeling, thinking and action.

The passionate denunciation of violence is the mechanism of escape in Gandhi's psychology. It is an escape from the consciousness of being an instrument of reaction—a crusader against the freedom of the individual.

Gandhi became the prophet of Indian Nationalism because Nationalism is denial of individual freedom. Sacrifice of the individual for the freedom, greatness and glory of the nation is the essence of Nationalism. The nation is composed of individuals. National freedom, therefore, should be conceived as the sum-total of the freedom of the individuals composing it. Nationalism, however, holds that the freedom of the whole is conditional upon the sacrifice (subordination) of the parts, that the nation is something bigger than the sum-total of its components. That is the mathematics of Nationalism. Evidently, it is wrong mathematics, and consequently false logic, because mathematics is logic. The essence of Nationalism, denial of the very existence of the individual, manifests itself fully in Fascism. That is the organic relation between Nationalism and Fascism.

Gandhist non-violence, therefore, is indeed the sublimation of violence. It is violence against man; consequently, it is violence against society; against all human striving for freedom and progress. Masochism is the psychological expression of this kind of insidious violence. Self-effacement, suffering, sacrifice, vow of poverty, penance, fast, voluntary subordination to a super-human power—all these paraphernalia of saintliness are masochistic virtues. The saint

practices them, or pretends to do so, not for himself, but as the object lesson for others. Man should be reduced to nothingness, subordinated and humiliated to a superior power.

How can there be any freedom in a world composed of dehumanised biological automata like that? Yet, that is the Gandhist utopia of inverted violence, sublimated as the saintly cult of non-violence.

Gandhi is not the first saintly moralist to serve the immoral purpose of reaction, to sublimate negation of freedom by tall talk about freedom; only, he talks always about India's independence from Britain, never about the freedom of Indians in India. That is the most significant omission. We shall revert to it in the course of the discussion.

In history, there have been many such prophets. It might not be correct to call them false prophets. Because, they were not consciously insincere. But as psycho-pathological phenomena, as abnormal human beings, they were all driven by motives very different from what they believed to be their motives. The objective truth, however, did not cease to exist because the saints, with all their cant about truth did not have the courage to recognise the truth.

The historical significance of Gandhi's role on the Indian scene is strikingly similar to that of Savonarola in Italy. Both are political saints. After a period of remarkable success, the Florentine friar failed. Gandhi's initial success has been more remarkable and more lasting. Savonarola wielded political power. Yet he failed. Gandhi has attained a greater measure of success without the advantage. Is he not, then, a greater saint? No, his success is due to a greater advantage—absence of the urge for freedom on the part of the Indian people. Savonarola tried to swim against the current of the spirit of the Renaissance, which overwhelmed him. "The Renaissance was swarming about him. In the cramped past, in the poverty and ignorance of the middle-ages, it had been possible perhaps for so unworldly a faith to flourish; but with affluence and culture, the world had outgrown the ascetic faith of its forefathers, and discovered in the classic revival, that of its ancestors, for whom the first and last law was the satisfaction of life. Life—imperfect, ruthless, lastly, lawless—was rich enough, and the only mastery of nature lay in its

imitation. He had pitted himself against a reawakening world, and who of his contemporaries sincerely felt as he did?" (Ralph Roeder, "The Man of the Renaissance")

Faith is fear of life. Gandhi preaches faith-blind, unadulterated faith amounting to unconditional submission. Those who are afraid of life, are anxious to run away from it, naturally cannot have the will to live, that is, will to be free. Because, there is no freedom except the freedom to live. At the time of Savonarola, there were few who thought like him. Gandhi had the advantage of practically a whole nation thinking like himself, because it has inherited an authoritarian psychology from its cultural traditions, which have not yet been repudiated by the spirit of Renaissance. That is the secret of Gandhi's success.

Savonarola put up the last resistance to the spirit of Renaissance, which represented love of life, joy of living, and therefore will to freedom. He failed. If Gandhi finally succeeds in the same historical role, that will be not because of any greater excellence of his doctrines, but because in India the spirit of Renaissance, the quest for freedom, is still very weak, almost absent.

The sublimated reactionary strivings of Savonarola, adjusted to the specific problems of the age, asserted themselves eventually through the Reformation. Had not the Renaissance been superseded by the Reformation, Europe might not have to go through the excruciating experience of Fascism. As against the libertarianism of the Renaissance, the Reformation provided moral and metaphysical sanction for authoritarianism. As the enemy of Indian Renaissance, which is yet to come, Gandhi, therefore is the prophet of Indian Fascism. In that sense, he has a greater affinity with Luther and Calvin than with the Florentine monk. He has attained greater measures of success than his classical prototype, because Fascism is no longer a far cry.

The deluding facades of Gandhism, however, are crumbling. It is in a crisis. Gandhi is defeated as a moral prophet. To-day he stands at the parting of ways—between ethics and politics. His present attitude indicates the choice he has made. He has abandoned resistance to India's participation in the war. That is a clear departure from the doctrine of absolute non-violence. His declaration that

Congress now would accept what it rejected in 1942, on the plea that history does not repeat itself, is sheer opportunism. Political opportunism and pedantic moralising are misfits. Why should the saint descend from his moral pedestal for mundane purposes? Evidently, he is moved by other motives than those present in his conscious mind, namely, truth and non-violence. Indeed, these (his sincerity regarding which need not be questioned) are mere sublimations of the subconscious motives which actually determine his feeling, thinking and action. These urges, in their turn, result from the peculiar social and cultural pattern constituting the prophet's character structure and personality.

Gandhi is doing the bidding of big business. He has always done that. Now he is unabashed. He has the advantage of an audience which has a will to believe. Gandhi's National Government, composed of men chosen from the elected members of the Central Assembly, will be a tool in the hands of big business as the latter has proclaimed its plan of economic development under a Fascist dictatorship. Gandhi is the prophet of that dictatorship.

Machiavelli judged Savonarola as "a time-serving and self-seeking demagogue, veering with every shift of the political wind". Someone in India must have the courage and the "ferreting eyes" of the greatest statesman of the Renaissance, if India is to be free from her "spell-binder", who would otherwise hand her over to Fascism to destroy freedom, which is still to be won.

While anxiously waiting for her Machiavelli, India may recollect the question he raised while reviewing Savonarola's life : "Whether innovation succeeds prayer or by force?" His answer is equally memorable : "All armed prophets have conquered, and all unarmed have been destroyed, as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who ruined with his new order of things, as soon as the crowd ceased to believe in him."

The lesson of a rich period of history, as taught by the wisest man of the time, is that, if Gandhi succeeds finally, he will do so as an armed prophet—the prophet of Indian Fascism.

CHAPTER V

PROPHET OF NATIONAL SOCIALISM

In addition to Gandhi's non-violence, there is another factor which is supposed to guarantee the purity of Indian Nationalism. That is Jawaharlal Nehru—the sea-green incorruptible of Indian politics. Next to the Mahatma, he is the leader of Indian Nationalism. He is moreover an avowed internationalist and a fervent Socialist. How can a movement led by such a man have anything to do with Fascism?

A closer look reveals the clay-feet of this God also. Just as passionate profession of non-violence (and passion may not vouch for sincerity) does not alter the objective fact that the Mahatma is a prophet of Indian Fascism, just so are Nehru's Socialism and internationalism no guarantee against his becoming the other prophet of the same cult.

The relation between the two, which puzzles the superficial observer, is the logical consequence of the similarity of the apparently different ideas and ideals cherished by them respectively. The puzzle of the relation between Gandhi and Nehru, indeed, the puzzle of one single movement being led simultaneously by two men apparently belonging to two cultural epochs, results from the fact that contemporary India does live in two historical epochs : Chronologically, she lives in the twentieth century, but historically, in the scale of social evolution, she still languishes several hundred years behind. This appears to be a paradox. But that paradox is the basic fact of the Indian situation. In it lies the clue to the entire complex of problems—political, social and cultural—presented by contemporary India.

We shall revert to this apparent paradox. For the moment, let us examine the equally apparent paradox of a professed Socialist, and ardent internationalist, qualifying himself as the other prophet of Indian Fascism.

Before we proceed, it is necessary to clarify one point. In this discussion, Fascism is not used as a term of abuse. Even the standard of good or evil is not applied. There is a body of philosophical and social thought which has come to be known as Fascism. It represents a specific appreciation of cultural values, indeed, of the very purpose of human existence. Fascism is necessarily, not by choice nor contingently, associated with a known political practice required for the establishment of the "new order" of its ideal. The purpose of this discussion is not to decide whether Fascism is good or bad. It is to prove the contention that Indian Nationalism, indeed Nationalism anywhere, in our time, is identical with Fascism. The necessary evidence is found in an examination of Nationalism. We are simply making a scientific examination of a phenomenon. The standard of good or evil has no application in a scientific investigation. Ours is an analysis of the anatomy and physiology of Nationalism, so to say. We are simply establishing the identity of two phenomena—Fascism and Nationalism. The analysis will help the reader judge the significance of Nationalism; the judgment will be determined by his attitude towards Fascism. Indian Nationalism has, indeed, developed in the Fascist direction, because the average nationalist judgment about Fascism is favourable. But the responsibility of making the judgment is left to the reader. We shall only examine facts and compare them.

When it is remembered that in Germany Fascism assumed the name of National-Socialism, Nehru's attempt to give Indian Nationalism a pinkish tinge need not be taken very seriously. On the contrary, that attempt proves that Nationalism could no longer stand on its own legs, and therefore must sail under false colours. Nehru added the false colour, which misled the immature youth incorporating the vague urge for social freedom. That urge was objectively antagonistic to Nationalism. If allowed to be articulate, it was bound to threaten the *status quo*, which constitutes the social basis of Nationalism. To disrupt eventually the social *status quo*, which keeps the individual in spiritual and temporal subjugation, it must challenge the authority of tradition, and act as the solvent of the cultural patterns which provide the moral sanction for the *status quo*—the chain of the servitude of Indian humanity.

If Nationalism incorporated the urge for the social freedom of the oppressed masses, and cultural liberation of the individual, then it would not be necessary to embellish it with a pink tinge of pseudo-Socialism. Nationalism having lost all liberating significance, in the social and human sense, incipient progressive forces were in search of a new ideal. Still very inadequately differentiated from the mass of Indian humanity, they were groping in the dark. In that crisis, Nehru confused issues by combining Socialism with Nationalism. He arrested the process of differentiation between the forces of progress and reaction by throwing to the immature spokesmen of the former a new toy—the dilettante concern for international situation and the fashionable talk about Socialism. The glitter of a Socialist Utopia blinded the youthful champions of social freedom to the limitation of Nationalism.

Once reconciled to the antiquated cult, which was on the point of losing its appeal for the fighters for freedom, the romantic crusaders for social freedom became fired with the fanaticism of reconverts. They crossed the Rubicon—of social and cultural differentiation—back to the camp of reaction, to function eventually as the storm-troop of Indian Fascism. Holding up the false colour of pseudo-Socialism, Nehru led them back to that position of doubtful glory. It was pseudo-Socialism, because otherwise it could not be reconciled with Nationalism to the extent of serving it as a decoy for its objectively potential enemies.

Therefore, if Gandhi is the prophet of Nationalism, Nehru is the prophet of National-Socialism. National-Socialism in practice cannot be anything but Fascism. It was so in Germany; it has not been any different in India, as we shall presently show. Gandhist Nationalism, on the other hand, as has already been exposed, is Fascism. Things equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Gandhist Nationalism, whose reactionary social and cultural character cannot be denied, is thus equal to Nehru's "Socialism".

That solves the puzzle of the relation between the two men belonging apparently to two cultural epochs. One represents the mass ignorance and fear of freedom; the other is the demagogue who exploits these assets of social reaction. They do not contradict; they supplement each other. The two together compose a split personality.

Fear of freedom and demagoguery, which extols the flight from freedom as the struggle for freedom, are the essential features of Fascism.

The saint is also a demagogue. But his demagoguery would not appeal to the comparatively small number of Indians who are at least to some extent affected by the social and cultural atmosphere of the twentieth century. It is Nehru's role to have brought them back under the influence of the saintly spell-binder. Even in the case of the ignorant masses, the saintly demagoguery has been supplemented by that of the prophet of National-Socialism. The latter's bombastic promises coupled with tirades against capitalism and landlordism, in the classical Hitler style, have reinforced the faith that Gandhi Raj would be Ram Raj.

Nehru's political future was predetermined when he sponsored the organisation of the Congress-Socialist Party. Previous to that, his profession of Socialism might have been sincere, though not intelligent. His first application of Socialism to India was the demand for the nationalisation of land. That was a progressive demand; it could be a demand of Nationalism, if this was to represent the striving for democratic freedom. The Congress did not endorse Nehru's demand. That should have convinced him that it did not stand for democratic freedom. Instead of seeing the obvious, he vulgarised Socialism by identifying it with nationalisation of land, which can be associated with economic systems based on private ownership. Socialism is applicable only to a highly developed capitalist society. In the capitalist society, land is not the main means of production. Therefore, nationalisation of land, within the framework of the capitalist society, does not mean Socialism; it does not abolish the private ownership of the means of capitalist production.

In the first flush of the zeal of a Socialist crusader, Nehru was completely ignorant of these implications of his propaganda in the context of the given Indian situation. Evidently, it was a mere fashion or a fad. It might have been youthful romanticism. Whatever it might have been, that initial mistake of preaching a doctrine without taking the trouble of understanding it, qualified Nehru for the role of the prophet of National-Socialism in India. His understanding of Socialism being vague and defective, he could combine it with

reactionary Nationalism without any theoretical difficulty or qualm of conscience.

Nehru, of course, has never absorbed Marxism as a philosophy, although in his autobiography he calls himself a Marxist and even goes to the extent of making the impression that, if he was born with a silver-spoon in his mouth, that was a Socialist silver-spoon. Acceptance of the Marxist philosophy would never allow Nehru to stand in the relation he has always stood to Gandhi. His apparent advance towards Socialism and Marxism was the typical groping of the lonesome individual of the twentieth century. That typical groping for a vaguely conceived new world, in the context of the disintegrating capitalist society and dissolving bourgeois culture, also becomes the modern man's search for God, who is eventually found in Fascism. Nehru is a modern man in search of God. He found his God in Gandhi—the prophet of Indian Fascism. His role of the other prophet of the same cult was thus historically determined.

Congress-Socialism in the beginning, appeared as a revolt against reactionary Nationalism—against Gandhist authoritarian leadership, just then caught in one of its periodical crises. But the historical significance of National-Socialism was exposed as soon as it found its leader in Nehru. On the other hand, Nehru betrayed Socialism (his earlier adhesion has been unintelligent, but most probably sincere), as soon as he came to the unwarranted conclusion that the Congress could be converted to Socialism.

Nationalism and Socialism are mutually exclusive. Any alliance or "synthesis" between the two is possible only at the cost of the latter. Nationalism seeks this fraudulent alliance, when it can no longer stand on its own legs. Having exhausted all progressive possibilities and lost its liberating role, Nationalism then counts on demagoguery as its only weapon. Socialism, prepared to prostitute itself, serves that purpose of antiquated, reactionary, Nationalism. It helps exhausted Nationalism to acquire a new lease of life in the form of Fascism. Nehru's Socialism has played that role in India. Therefore, he will go down in history as the other prophet of Indian Fascism.

CHAPTER VI

INDEPENDENCE *VERSUS* FREEDOM

With the apparently revolutionary cry of anti-imperialism, Socialism rationalised the racial animus of Nationalism. As the advocate of complete independence, Nehru raised that cry. Capitalism was to be fought in its imperialist form. Imperialism was represented by an alien race. Socialist anti-imperialism, therefore, easily became identical with the anti-British sentiment of Nationalism.

As a matter of fact, anti-imperialism, the battle-cry of the pseudo-socialist left Nationalism, became the expression of the most virulent racial animosity. That is how Socialism became an instrument of Nationalism, securing the purpose of rationalising its basest sentiment. It was indeed worse; the anti-imperialist cry of National Socialism (and subsequently of Communism) made of uncompromising racial animosity the highest revolutionary virtue. Nothing could have rendered greater help to the rise of Fascism.

Capitalism was historically associated with modern civilisation. But that association did not prevent the founders of scientific Socialism from appreciating the liberating significance of modern civilisation. Indeed, they appreciated capitalism itself as a progressive force, because it did usher in the modern civilisation.

The "civilising mission of the white race" has been a cant as well as a matter of ridicule. But the fact remains that the parts of the world where capitalism was delayed in developing, came in touch with modern civilisation through the instrumentality of Imperialism. Even that painful coincidence of history was objectively appreciated by the founder of scientific Socialism. Marx was the first to recognise the historically revolutionary significance of the British conquest of India. That appreciation of the historical role of Imperialism was all the more correct later on, when

representatives of a progressive capitalism replaced the adventurers and freebooters who had made the first conquest.

The theory that an uncompromising anti-imperialism is the greatest revolutionary virtue in the colonial countries and also in the imperialist countries, is deduced from the fact that Imperialism is the highest form of capitalism. But curiously enough, the corollary to the deduction has been ignored. Capitalism being a progressive force, it cannot be without that historical significance in the highest stage of its development. The "civilising" of modern Imperialism, therefore, cannot be denied theoretically; nor can that be done pragmatically.

Some of the colonial people might have by themselves experienced modern civilisation had their normal social evolution not been interfered with by Imperialism. On the other hand, it is undeniable that Imperialism brought the backward colonial countries within the orbit of capitalist economy, operating as a world force, and consequently helped the disruption of pre-capitalist social relations which militate against a country experiencing modern civilisation. That is why Marx characterised the British conquest of India as a revolutionary event. In a latter stage of colonial exploitation, Imperialism actually introduces in the colonial countries the capitalist mode of production.

India, for instance, might have been one of the foremost capitalist countries of the world, had she been left alone, and consequently, to-day, the mass of her people might have enjoyed a higher standard of living. But it is an undeniable fact that the economic conditions of the country, as a whole, to-day are on a higher level than they were two hundred years ago. Only, the blind prejudice of racial Nationalism denies that historical fact. And the Socialist anti-imperialism has pandered to that prejudice. Consequently, Nationalism has lost all historical perspective; its ideal of freedom has become devoid of all social content; and racial rancour has become the moving force of nationalist politics. In short, the anti-imperialist emphasis of Socialism has contributed incalculably to the degeneration of Nationalism into Fascism.

The vehemence of the Socialist anti-imperialist propaganda has only a hypothetical justification. It pretends to be different from the full-blooded racialism of the unsophisticated sentimental nationalist.

It claims to be theoretically motivated. The authority is Marx, Lenin and Stalin, although the gods, particularly the last one, have fallen out of grace since the remorseless progress of this war revealed the real battle-fronts of the international civil war of our epoch. Stalin is now denounced as the stout pillar propping up tottering Imperialism from the left; and the Soviet Union is described by the theoreticians of Indian National-Socialism as the left bulwark of Imperialism.

However, the contention of the Socialist anti-imperialist propaganda is that colonial economy has pauperised the masses. This contention evidently is not borne out by facts. It can be maintained only hypothetically : Had Imperialism not intervened, the colonial countries would have prospered. Therefore, the present economic condition of the masses can be described as pauperisation only in comparison to that hypothetical prosperity. It is sheer nonsense to maintain that the Indian masses are poorer to-day than under the benign rule of the Great Moghuls or in the legendary Ram Raj, or imaginary Vikram Era.

Anti-Imperialism confused the issues involved in the struggle for national liberation. The issues were social. The social content of the struggle for national freedom, which invested it with an objectively revolutionary significance, was democratic revolution. It was a civil war, to be fought between the forces of progress and reaction inside the Indian society. Anti-Imperialism placed the enemy of Indian progress outside the Indian society. It accentuated the social rancour of Nationalism at the cost of the latter's social purpose. "Revolutionary Nationalists", as the anti-imperialists called themselves, were instrumental in divorcing the struggle for national freedom from the historically overdue democratic revolution.

Deviating from its objectively revolutionary purpose, Nationalism became the instrument of reaction, and assumed a purely negative racial complexion. The social ideal of freedom, an ideal set before the Indian people by the objective urge for progress, was forgotten in the midst of the racial cry for national independence. Nehru became the leader of left Nationalism, not as a Socialist championing the liberation of the toiling masses but as the uncompromising anti-imperialist crusader fighting for complete national independence. Socialist anti-imperialism swayed the masses to forget freedom for the fraud of independence.

National independence should be the means to attain the end of social freedom. Otherwise, it would not be an ideal worth fighting for. But anti-imperialism made an end of the means and expounded the theory of national unity, which guaranteed that independence would be negation of freedom.

Imperialism is the common enemy of all Indians. They must unite in the struggle to overthrow it. Unity calls for subordination of the mutual antagonism amongst the factors to be united. In order to fight Imperialism, the oppressed masses should forget their antagonism to the native exploiting classes, and accept the leadership of their enemies. Under the given circumstances, the relation could not be otherwise. Mass pressure on the leadership of a powerful and privileged minority is a romantic imagination, which serves as the psychological mechanism of escape from the guilty conscience of delivering the masses to the tender mercies of their exploiters.

Anti-Imperialism thus helped the upper classes to capture the leadership of the nationalist movement. The democratic revolution constituting the social content of the struggle for national liberation, was defeated. The socialists, and later on, Communists, were the most enthusiastic propagandists of Gandhi's leadership which provided the moral sanction to the counter-revolution. Having degenerated into rank racialism, anti-Imperialism did more harm to the cause of Indian freedom than Imperialism has ever done. It justified the nationalist betrayal of the democratic revolution. Having betrayed the revolution, Nationalism stood exposed in its native character of Fascism. "National Revolution" became the deceptive cloak of counter-revolution, just as it was in Germany.

In India, National-Socialism followed the historical pattern. The Versailles Treaty had planned to cripple German Imperialism and Prussian Militarism. In so far as the plan was put into practice, it did help German Democracy. Under the Weimar Republic, the German people enjoyed the greatest measure of freedom. The upper classes conspired, and helped the rise of Fascism to destroy German freedom. India to-day is the victim of a similar conspiracy. The *entente* powers conspired with the German upper classes against German freedom. British Imperialism is conspiring with Indian capitalism against the freedom of the Indian people. The object of

the conspiracy is to establish a Fascist dictatorship which will be no better than Imperialism.

The social crisis in Germany—inflation and mass unemployment—out of which Fascism rose was the creation of the German upper classes. Germany was in the midst of a fierce civil war; the forces of reaction were on the offensive. But the forces of revolution were gathering strength with the object of going over to the counter-attack. At that juncture, Hitler appeared on the scene with his National-Socialism, which held Entente Imperialism responsible for all the misfortunes of the German people. He preached national unity for national revolution. National unity was to be established on the surrender of the exploited masses to the exploiting upper classes. Anybody refusing to abandon freedom or the struggle for it, was denounced as the enemy of national liberation. The impending social revolution was to be liquidated for the triumph of the imaginary national revolution, which in effect was a counter-revolution. Full-blooded Nationalism, the spirit of revenge, hatred for the Entente Powers, the fascinating prospect of Germany again becoming a great militarist Power,—swayed the conservative middle-classes. Socialism supplied the appeal for the backward labouring masses. But it was to be subordinated to Nationalism. National Revolution, which meant counter-revolution on the home front and overthrow of the Republic, was the immediate need. Socialism was to follow. The promised “Second Revolution”, however, never came. Those followers of Hitler who entertained that illusion, paid for their stupidity with their lives.

All that programme of counter-revolution was propagated and executed with the cry that Germany must be independent by throwing off the yoke of Entente Imperialism. By whipping up the hatred for an external enemy, very largely imaginary, in so far as the misery of the German masses was concerned, the real enemy at home, the enemy of the freedom of the German people, was helped to win the losing battle.

Anti-Imperialism is similarly helping counter-revolution in India. It is the creed of Indian National-Socialism. To put it differently; sailing under the false colours of anti-Imperialism, in India also, National-Socialism is playing a counter-revolutionary role.

Carried away by the racial cult of anti-Imperialism, Socialists have become champions for native capitalism. Racial bias persuades "Marxists" to provide the theoretical justification for the unabashed Fascist ambition of Indian capitalism. Gandhism provides the common platform for National-capitalism and National-Socialism. The racial cry of national independence serves to hide the sinister conspiracy against Indian freedom.

Having thrived in the rank atmosphere of racial animosity, created by the anti-Imperialist propaganda of the so-called Revolutionary Nationalism, Indian Fascism to-day is receiving the patronage of decrepit Imperialism. Fascism can never come to power without the aid and connivance of the established State, against which it wages a war. The antagonism between Nationalism and Imperialism, therefore, should have prevented the triumph of Fascism in India. But Imperialism to-day is nothing more than a bogey. Therefore, the anti-Imperialist cry, the demand for simple political independence, only serves the purpose of Indian Fascism. While the orthodox nationalists, the National-Socialists and also the National-Communists are crying hoarse their anti-Imperialist slogans, a National-Capitalist State is rapidly growing parallel to, indeed, within the framework of the decayed Imperialist State, with the aid and connivance of the latter. Therefore, the danger of Fascism in India is greater to-day than ever before. It may triumph in this country when it will be defeated in other parts of the world.

CHAPTER VII

PROBLEM OF FREEDOM

An ideal is easily visualised; but its attainment is a problem. In the case of the ideal of national independence, the problem has been simplified. It will be attained upon the transfer of political power from the British to Indians. But the problem of freedom is more fundamental it cannot be so simplified. The question is : Will an India *independent* of Britain be a *free* India? Or will national independence *at least* create conditions conducive to the solution of the problem of freedom?

For the unthinking, sentimental nationalist, this question may not even arise. For him, national independence is an end in itself. But there are others, for whom it is only the means to an end. The end is freedom.

The grave danger of the present situation in India is that the positive ideal of freedom is appreciated only by a few, comparatively. Racial animosity, sublimated as the demand for national independence, has suppressed the urge for freedom even in the most modern minded Indian men and women. That abnormal situation greatly complicates the problem of freedom. The fact that the anti-British feeling of the average Indian is historically motivated, does not eliminate the more regrettable fact that this feeling has resulted in the subordination of the ideal of freedom to that of national independence. So much so, that the question whether India's independence from Britain will make Indians free, is not even raised. This is a psycho-pathological state. Who or what has been responsible for a disease, is entirely irrelevant for its diagnosis and prescription for its cure.

Cultivation of the concept of freedom, of the aptitude to appreciate and cherish the ideal of freedom, is the cure for the mass psycho-pathological state. The appreciation of a greater, positive ideal will not in the least minimise the importance of the means for its

attainment. National independence (which can only be relative, and necessarily restricted, in the contemporary world) is an ideal worth fighting and dying for, only as the means to the end of the social emancipation, cultural progress and spiritual autonomy of the men and women inhabiting India. But if national independence is made an end in itself, and its attainment calls for sacrifices including that of the very concept of freedom, its liberating value becomes doubtful. Indeed, the fanatical cry for such independence is a negation of freedom. That having been the cry of Indian Nationalism, it has not led India anywhere towards freedom. On the contrary, it has created an atmosphere conducive to Fascism. There is no greater mistake and no graver danger than to ignore the fact that the nationalist political atmosphere of the country and its background of social and cultural traditions, are fertile soil for Fascism.

Political nationalism, motivated by racial animosity, however, could not degenerate into Fascism, had not the modern concept of freedom been so very foreign to the average Indian mentality. Be it noted with emphasis that it is not a peculiarly Indian mentality; it is the mediaeval mentality, which is a universal phenomenon in a certain stage of social evolution. The fact we are identifying as having contributed fundamentally to the rise of Fascism in India, is the mediaeval mentality on the part of the great bulk of our people. This mentality cannot conceive of freedom, and therefore, can be a willing tool in the hand of a reaction depicting freedom as the spectre of isolated, helpless, lonesome, individuals, cut adrift from the moorings of the security of the joint family and the paternalism of the feudal-patriarchal society. Freedom is also depicted as immorality, irreligiosity and godlessness, which are repugnant to those traditionally accustomed to rely for every-thing upon a supernatural power.

Many among the small minority of the Indian people, which lives in the twentieth century socially and culturally as well as chronologically, have also given way under the terrific pressure of the mediaeval mass mentality which constitutes the psychological basis of reactionary, militant nationalism, the militancy being the expression of race hatred, which, in its turn, is a manifestation of inferiority complex.

The general absence of the appreciation of the concept of freedom, even in contemporary India, supposed to be fighting for freedom, appears to be a paradox. This apparent paradox results from a peculiar combination of circumstances. There are three factors involved.

Firstly, though living chronologically in the twentieth century, the vast bulk of the Indian population historically (socially and culturally), lag several hundred years behind. They live under social and cultural conditions which do not concede an autonomous existence to the individual; life is believed to be a succession of predetermined events beyond the control of man; subordination to super-human authority and to its agents or agencies on earth, is glorified as the highest of human virtues. Under these conditions, the very idea of freedom cannot be conceived.

Secondly, the inadequacy and the negative nature of the freedom in capitalist society having been exposed, the plausible criticism of that type of transitional freedom serves the purpose of reinforcing the mediaeval man's fear of freedom. The condemnation of Western civilisation, which is identified with all the evils of capitalism (the break-up of patriarchal family and the individualisation of man are counted among the evils) seeks to discredit the idea of freedom.

Thirdly, in the midst of the generally prevailing social atmosphere, the very idea of a higher form of freedom, positive freedom, supplying the individual with the new moorings of a co-operative collective existence, cannot even be conceived except by a very few.

To describe the position more briefly and concretely : The social psychology of India is still mediaeval; but the ideals of capitalist culture having faded, do not offer even the modern educated Indian a sufficiently strong incentive to break away from the mediaeval mentality, and sway the people with ideals of transitional freedom. On the other hand, in the largely pre-capitalist social environments, the higher positive freedom of the Socialist society appears to be an utopia. Moreover, the negative attitude towards modern civilisation precludes the possibility of the belief in something better resulting from it. As Socialism can only be a super-structure on the foundation of the modern civilisation, it cannot have any appeal for those who believe the latter to be an evil. No good cometh out of evil.

Freedom is the absence of all obstacles to the pursuit of happiness. Happiness is satisfaction of desires. Therefore, dogmatic morality, which sets up immutable standards of good and evil, is the greatest enemy of freedom. If Nationalism could have any appreciation of the ideal of freedom, Gandhi could not be its prophet. Before the ideal of freedom could occupy a prominent place in the scheme of her political life, a sufficiently large number of men and women in India must share the ideological aim pursued by modern humanity ever since the days of the Renaissance. The aim was self-realisation of the individual.

Freedom is not a beautiful castle built in the air of imagination. It rests on the triple pillar of humanism, individualism and rationalism.

Modern thought quickened by scientific knowledge places man in the centre of the Universe. He is not a marionette to dance according to the whims of an imaginary Providence pulling strings from behind the scene. Life is not the means to an end. It is an end in itself. The sole purpose of life is to live, and to live is to enjoy life. Knowledge gives man the power to establish his mastery of the world, and satisfy all his desires, which are integral parts of his very being. Satisfaction of desires, therefore, is the self-realisation of life. Freedom is the highest ideal, because only a free man can have the fullest joy of living. Freedom is the condition for the self-realisation of life.

The supreme importance of the individual logically follows from the noble, liberating, doctrine of Humanism. The establishment of the autonomy of the individual results from such psychological conditions as preclude subordination to any external authority. The metaphysical concept of soul is internalisation of an external authority. An extraneous authority enthrones itself in the consciousness of the individual, and compels the negation of his or her independent existence. Non-submission to any higher power is the essence of freedom. The progressive unfolding of the creative genius of man is conditional upon the self-realisation of the individual. Only when man feels himself to be his own master, can he have the bold vision of shaping his own destiny and, in co-operation with other equally free individuals, remake the world in which life can realise itself in joyful living.

Man's independence of the super-human leads to the proclamation of the sovereignty of reason, inherent in his own being. As man has his being and becoming in the context of society and nature, his reason can never be out of tune with the harmony of the Universe. But reason is not an immaterial category. The physical nature is also rational. Determinism is the reason in nature. Conversely, reason is the operation of physical determinism on the psychological plan. Rationalism explains man's being and becoming without the superfluous assumption of metaphysical categories, and thus frees him from all irrational authorities. Having proclaimed the sovereignty of reason, individualism, in its turn, is reinforced by rationalism.

Only on that philosophical and psychological foundation can the structure of collective freedom be raised by the continuous efforts and collective work of spiritually liberated individuals. By breaking up the mediaeval society, capitalism frees the individual; but that freedom does not go beyond transforming individuals into atomised, isolated, helpless, social units. That is only a step towards freedom, which lies beyond the capitalist social order. Atomised individuals, free from their responsibilities and limitations, imposed by the mediaeval social relations and cultural traditions, constitute the foundation of capitalist society. Atomisation makes the position of the individual extremely insecure. Gainful and productive employment is not a part of his freedom. He is not obliged to serve anybody; nor is anybody obliged to give him employment; if involuntary unemployment brings him starvation, there is none to be held responsible.

That is a tragic result of the freedom of the individual in capitalist society. Freedom from the past, temporal as well as spiritual, opens up the way to freedom in the future. In the intermediary period, freedom is a precarious position, a formal gain of doubtful immediate value. The individual was freed from the bondage of mediaeval society, but only to be newly enslaved in the capitalist society. The earlier bondage gave him some security, either in the patriarchal family or in serfdom. The new enslavement was without that saving grace. Formal freedom only atomised the individual, cut him asunder from his old moorings, and cast him off, to be tossed in the sea of competition, the ruthless struggle for existence. Without social

freedom, the spiritual freedom, heralded by the Renaissance, was soon overwhelmed by doubts, fears and misgivings.

The past tries to regain the allegiance of the individual, freed from the bondage of mediaeval society, by offering him the security of submission to authority as against the insecurity and helplessness of his present position. On the other hand, the future holds out the prospect of security without submission. Eventually the call of positive freedom in the future inspires the relatively free individual to transcend the limits of the capitalist society. The latter feels its foundation shaken. For its own existence, it must throw its whole weight in support of the dead past, claiming the soul of the atomised, helpless, individual. The present having forfeited its moral authority, owing to its inability to offer any security to the freed individual, capitalist society, in a crisis, appeals to the authority of the past. It encourages, indeed organises, a stampede in quest of the imaginary security in the submission to an authority, be it the metaphysical State or the super-man, or the saint. Fascism represents that mass flight from freedom.

In India, Fascism is not even a flight from freedom. The individual never broke away from the authoritarian tradition. There was no advance towards freedom. Therefore, in this country, Fascism grows directly out of the background of a mediaeval society, clinging to the authoritarian tradition of submission to a super-natural power and its agents or agencies on earth—as the guarantee against the danger of freedom. Therefore, nationalist India proudly claims to be the spiritual home of frustrated, atomised, individuals fleeing from modern civilisation in search of a superior power to which they can surrender their tormented souls in the vain hope of obtaining protection and security. Helpless individuals seeking shelter in the foul backwaters of authoritarianism and traditionalism, are the victims of Fascism. Nationalist India, therefore, is the spiritual home of Fascism. Defeated on the battle-fields of Europe, the beast might crawl into the security of that lair, which in that case would be the epicentre of a future convulsion of humanity. The beast must be hunted down in its spiritual lair, if freedom is to be guaranteed for the future of mankind, including India.

Having failed ever to conceive of the very idea of freedom, India will be free only when freedom will be conferred on her by a free

world. Therefore, the very few Indians who are spiritually liberated enough to appreciate freedom as something far greater than mere national independence—the composite Man of the Indian Renaissance—attach greater importance to modern civilisation surviving the present crisis. The defeat of Nationalism is the condition for Indian freedom. Because, Nationalism is inspired by the tradition of the negation of freedom. In contemporary India, freedom is not even an ideal. Therefore, the problem of freedom is so very complicated.

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAYS OF INDIAN FASCISM

A rather exhaustive discussion of the various aspects of nationalist politics carried on objectively with the purpose of clarifying the fundamental issue, has revealed that in this country the danger of Fascism cannot disappear, nor even diminish, because of the certainty of military defeat of the Axis Powers. We characterised the Gandhi-Viceroy correspondence as side-tracking the issue, because from one side, the danger of Fascism was camouflaged and, from the other side, it was ignored. Therefore, if the correspondence produced any positive result, India would not advance towards Freedom; on the contrary, Fascism, in this country, would have a greater chance of success.

Let it be recollected that even a non-violent benevolent despotism, under the saintly vigilance of Gandhi, would be a Fascist dictatorship, because by its very nature it would be a negation of freedom—freedom as described in course of this discussion. Let it also be repeated that the realisation of the danger of Fascism is proportionate to the urge for freedom. This urge being felt only by a comparatively few in this country, the danger of Fascism is not fully realised. Indeed, the average Indian, swayed by the antiquated cult of Nationalism, does not regard Fascism as a danger. Therefore, the danger is all the greater, objectively, for the people.

The danger is aggravated, from the other side, by the attitude of the British Government. Either it honestly ignores the fact that the conflict with the Congress and its supporters, apologists and auxiliaries, since the beginning of the war, is an integral part of the anti-Fascist struggle waged inside India; or it deliberately connives at Fascism in this country, and, with this sinister purpose of putting it in power, tirelessly pleased with it to conform to certain conventions of procedure. If it is really a matter of honest ignorance, honesty in

this case amounts to stupidity. Because, only the most densely stupid government could ignore the facts and their implications. In the latter case, it is a sinister conspiracy—of the sort which in Europe culminated in the infamous Munich Pact, and enabled Hitler to march from power to power.

The purpose of the British policy in India, however, still remains a matter of doubt. It may be a mixture of ignorance (or inefficiency in gathering information) and anti-democratic predisposition. It is, perhaps, subconsciously inspired by the tradition of Chamberlin's appeasement diplomacy in Europe. And it has had very similar consequences.

The Cripps mission was expected to consummate in an Indian Munich Pact. The Muslim minority, together with the Indian Democracy as a whole, might have been handed over to a Congress National Government, had not Indian Fascism, encouraged by the difficult position of its immediate enemy, (appeasing British Imperialism is essentially not an enemy of Indian Fascism), become head-strong and over-played its hand. The August revolt was the September 1, 1939, of Indian Fascism. It marked the outbreak of the anti-Fascist war on the Indian front.

Thereafter, appeasement policy could no longer be possibly practised. The war had to be fought out. The enemy was defeated more easily, because in India it was not in power. Here, the political nature of the hostility was not obscured by clash of arms, and the specious plea of military emergency. Nevertheless, the determination to fight the battle on the political and ideological front to the bitter end was absent.

As soon as the enemy was defeated on the semi-military front of open rebellion, peace was offered on his unconditional surrender. The political and ideological issues involved in the conflict were ignored. Indeed, no importance was attached to them. Let the declaration of open rebellion be withdrawn, and the family would be happily reunited, the prodigal would be welcomed back home by slaughtering not one calf, but the two calves of Indian Democracy and Freedom; negotiation for the transfer of power would be reopened with the formally repentant rebel as the heir-apparent of the present Government.

The resumption of the policy of appeasement, which emboldened Indian Fascism to make a desperate bid for power in the most critical moment of history, again encouraged the defeated rebel to be recalcitrant. The obvious anxiety of the British to appease them occasioned the hope that, even after the defeat in the first round, they could strike a hard bargain regarding monopolist power.

The bargain was conducted through the Gandhi-Viceroy correspondence and various other agencies, overt and covert. The powerful big business threw in its whole weight in favour of a settlement with the defeated rebels on their conditions. The Government apparently gave in under that pressure. It would not only connive at, but actually help, Fascism recover from its defeat on the adventurist semi-military front, by virtually endorsing the Bombay Plan (the programme of Indian Fascism) and allowing the gradual supercession of the decayed untenable Imperialist State by a National-Capitalist State. But the defeated rebel must give the pound of flesh. The "non-political" Government is not concerned with the programme of Indian Fascism, and would help it capture power constitutionally (which, under the given constitution, means most undemocratically); only, the formality of "unconditional surrender" must be observed.

The unsatisfactory outcome of his haughty correspondence with the Viceroy induced Gandhi to see that, under the given relation of forces, the wise should stoop to conquer. Only, it was not wisdom, but vulgar opportunism, clever tactics of retreat, at the best. That also did not succeed. Mr. Amery's latest speech seems to settle the issue. But does it, really? It does not.

The answer is determined by the conclusion of this analysis of the Indian situation on its historical and cultural background, the conclusion being that the issue is the danger of Fascism—Fascism versus Freedom. The danger of Fascism in India would not be removed even if the Congress rebels surrendered unconditionally. Because, "unconditional surrender" would again make them *persona grata* with the established Government, and the decisive condition for Fascism to succeed in any country would be recreated; the condition is the established Government helping Fascism to replace it.

The nth time repeated Cripps Offer is a concession to the upper classes which, either as representative of the ambitious monopolist capitalism, or as the bulwark of mediaeval traditions, are the driving forces of Indian Fascism. Defeat will ultimately compel the Congress to accept the offer. Gandhi has been fast moving in that direction of late.

But the danger of Fascism, the grave menace to the very possibility of Indian freedom (as distinct from national independence) will be still there, even if the conflict between the Congress and the Government cannot be composed and consequently the former fails to come to power. The Congress was only the instrument of Indian Fascism. If one instrument fails, a more suitable one will be created. Indeed, as soon as it was evident that, in consequence of the abortive rebellion, the Congress may not, at least for the immediate future, serve the purpose of the instrument for capturing power, its patrons took up the struggle for power directly. They were having given them the opportunity to gain control of the economic life of the country, to the extent of having a strangle-hold on the Government itself, the capitalist patrons of the Congress felt themselves strong enough to succeed where their Mahatma and his political machinery had failed, namely, to browbeat the Government to transfer power to them or their nominees.

They organised an economic hold-up which meant greater danger to the Government than the adventure of an open rebellion. Having thus beaten the "victorious" Government on the economic front, the patrons of the defeated rebellion announced a plan of economic development and demanded the establishment of a dictatorial regime to execute the plan.

While maintaining an uncompromising attitude towards the Congress, the Government has been very eager to placate its powerful patrons, who have grown more powerful during the war. The policy of appeasing Indian Fascism continues. Only, it is now practised directly in relation with the powers behind it, instead of their discredited political spokesmen.

The Bombay Plan represents the monopolist ambition of Indian capitalism, which has prospered from war profiteering. Therefore, it is the "Quit India" notice in another form. Having suffered a

defeat on the political front, Indian Fascism has declared war on the economic front. It has simply changed its ground, and on the new front of its own choice, it has been scoring victory after victory.

While demanding a formal unconditional surrender from a defeated army of Fascism, the Government is itself giving way before the new Fascist assault on the economic front. The concession is not only economic, or it is economic concession of such a magnitude as carries with it far-reaching political implications. For all practical purposes, the entire machinery of the established State is now controlled by big business, which is known to be the power behind the Congress.

Its political machinery (the Congress) having suffered a defeat, and being out of function for the moment, big business is now operating as the spearhead of Fascism. As such, it has penetrated deeply inside the citadel of the Government, which it proposes to replace by a nationalist dictatorship, and has been doing so, according to the pattern of the history of Fascism coming to power, with the aid and connivance of the established Government. Consequently, the danger of Fascism is, indeed, greater to-day than ever before.

The quarrel between the Congress and the Government only puts up a smoke-screen for the danger to grow still greater. The people at the helm of affairs may be given the benefit of doubt. They may not be deliberately playing into the hands of Indian Fascism. But their subservience to big business and vested interests generally cannot but help Indian Fascism. Most probably, they do not believe that there is any Fascism in India. Fascism is a product of the evil genius of Germany, and will disappear with the imminent defeat of the Axis powers. The danger of Fascism in India aggravates in consequence of this "non-political" attitude on the part of her present rulers, who are singularly indifferent to the conflict of ideas.

Therefore, the danger has to be exposed fully, and the social and cultural issues underlying the present political conflict clarified. When it is known that India has a larger share of the evil genius of Germany (authoritarian mentality and the predisposition to flee from freedom), which produced Fascism, one cannot be blind to the existence of that danger in this country also. And here the war has greatly reinforced the danger of Fascism instead of weakening it, as in Europe, by crushing military defeat.

The publication of the Bombay Plan is the counter-offensive of Indian Fascism. For the first time, Nationalism has been raised above the level of sentimentality and omnibus political demands. The mundane purpose of Nationalism is revealed. The Bombay Plan is said to be a plan of economic development. Yet, it postulates an authoritarian political regime as its essential condition. It does so because it is the plan of monopoly capitalism. And Fascism is the politics of monopoly capitalism.

The entire body of nationalist opinion is backing up the plan of monopoly capitalism—big business aspiring for dictatorial political power. The execution of the Bombay Plan will admittedly mean negation of freedom—even the relative freedom of capitalist society. A political regime which, for the political purpose of its beneficiaries, will curtail the freedom of smaller individual capitalists cannot be expected to establish freedom for the masses—either political or economical. The restriction of individual capitalist enterprise, which is necessary for the prosperity of capitalism in its period of decay, provide the plausible pretext for depriving the labouring masses even of the dubious freedom of selling their labour power freely, and the peasant masses of the right to sell the product of their toil in the free competitive market. Under monopoly capitalism, labour is regimented, the peasantry despoiled, and the middle-class employees pauperised. Fascism thrives in that atmosphere of freedom becoming a fraud. The execution of the Bombay Plan will celebrate the triumph of Indian Fascism.

In Europe, the negative consequences of capitalism created the psychological atmosphere suitable for the rise of Fascism. In the monopolist stage of capitalism, that psychological atmosphere is aggravated. Therefore, monopoly capitalism can abolish the formal freedom of the individual and establish authoritarianism as its own bulwark. If in Europe, notwithstanding the tradition of democracy and freedom, political as well as spiritual, monopoly capitalism could establish authoritarianism, in India it will have simple walk-over, because the tradition of a struggle for freedom is absent in this country, and the psychology of the spiritually backward masses is authoritarian.

Fascism comes to India thus from two directions,—directly out of the mediaeval cultural and psychological background of the

nationalist movement, and also as the ideology of monopolist capitalism. The latter's dictatorship will meet no resistance. Swayed by the authoritarian psychology of Nationalism, the entire country may willingly submit to Fascism, hailing it as the liberator.

There is nothing to choose between the political Nationalism of the Congress and its supporters and the economic plan of big business. It is Fascism fighting on two fronts, with the self-same objective of capturing power. Fascism may still have a joker up its sleeves. The Congress under Gandhi's or Nehru's leadership may put on war paint and declare a crusade against capitalism. That would be playing with distributed cards. Indeed, this classical Fascist tactic is to be expected. The Bombay Plan has exposed the social purpose of Nationalism; it has clarified the social issues underlying nationalist politics. By doing so, it has done a good turn to the champions of freedom. They can now show that in an independent nationalist India there will be no freedom. Like the offensive of 1942, the present counter-offensive on the economic front, therefore, may redound against Fascism itself. Faced with this danger, Fascism must fall back upon the weapon of demagoguery,—to deceive the people by dishonest anti-capitalist slogans which will only weaken the people's just awakening will to freedom; their faith in the prophet will be restored and reinforced, and they will be then all the more easily led for slaughter on the altar of authoritarianism.

In a situation so palpably fraught with the danger of Fascism, it is a grave mistake to reduce the political conflict, the struggle for power, to a settlement between quarrelling parties and politicians, or to constitutional procedures. The issue underlying the conflict is ideological; it is a struggle between modernism and mediaevalism. If freedom is the objective, and freedom is the opportunity for man to outgrow all limitations to the endless unfolding of his individuality, in the context of a cooperative community, then modernism must triumph over mediaevalism. That purpose will not be served by transferring power to the advocates of revivalism, and Indian big business is culturally no less revivalist than its patron-saint. Cultural revivalism provides moral sanction to authoritarianism, which is the ambition of monopolist capital.

The way out of the dangerous situation is to kindle in the people the fire of the urge for freedom. Helplessness makes them believe in

any demagogue, be he a saint or an uncompromising anti-Imperialist. Empower the people, and they will learn to rely on themselves. The Government may be baffled by the mental and political gyrations of the Mahatma. They may not be able to do anything to bring about communal peace as the basis for constitutional advance. But they can empower the people to settle the future of the country and take their destiny in their own hands.

The fighters for freedom, on the other hand, can inspire the people with the vision of power coming to themselves, and thus help them to conceive the idea of freedom.

CHAPTER IX

LESSON OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY

The controversy about the future Constitution of India centres around the question of power. The merit of any proposal of constitutional advance or of a provincial arrangement is measured by the degree of power proposed to be transferred. It is believed that the object of politics is to attain power. That is true in a way, to some extent. But it is only a half-truth.

Politics is defined as the science and art of civil administration. In that sense, political practice indeed presupposes possession of power. But the struggle for power is also a political practice. Because it is inspired by some ideals of social organisation and ideals of its administration. Power, therefore, is not an end in itself. It is necessary for political practice according to certain proclaimed ideals and specified ideas. If politics, in the sense of civil administration, is conditional upon the possession of State power, the struggle for political power derives a historical significance and moral justification from its underlying urge for a more equitable social organisation and its just administration.

The civil administration of a country or a community is guided by certain fundamental laws. They may be codified or conventional. The sum total of those fundamental laws is called the Constitution of a State established with the purpose of enforcing them. State is the political organisation of society, Government being the personnel and machinery for administering it in pursuance of the purpose enunciated in the Constitution, in the form of some social principles and ideals.

The Constitution of the body of the fundamental laws of the political organisation of a country is the declaration of ideals and statement of ideas which are to guide its administration. The demand for the change of an established Constitution implies not only

disapproval of the ideas and ideals underlying it, but the occupation of new ideas and ideals to replace the old ones.

State being the political organisation of society, a struggle for a change in its Constitution, to be historically and morally justified, must have a social purpose. Otherwise, politics degenerates into what is disparagingly called power-politics—a struggle for power for the sake of power. The pivoting of the entire controversy about the future Constitution of the country on the question of administrative power shows that Indian politics has degenerated into power-politics—politics without a social purpose. Power is sought not to alter the fundamental laws (unwritten, in the case of India) of the established social organisation, but only to have them administered by a different set of men, and perhaps with slightly different rules.

The political organisation of a country is reared on the basis of a given set of social relations. The function of the State is to maintain a specific economic organisation, fortified by the established social relations. The Constitution of the State, its fundamental laws, is accordingly determined. The set of men administering the affairs of the country may change from time to time; the administration itself may be carried on according to a new set of rules (legislation); the executive government may become responsible to a legislative body. But all that will not mean a political reorganisation of society, unless the struggle for power has for its conscious and calculated object the subversion of the established social relation.

Since the nature of the State, of the political organisation of a given society, is determined by the established social relations, the realisation of the necessity of substituting these by more equitable and liberating relations must motivate the demand for a constitutional change. Otherwise, transfer of power may overhaul the administrative super-structure of the State, but its social foundation will remain unaffected.

The Imperialist State in India was reared upon a set of property relations amongst the various classes of the native society. Its function was to maintain those social relations, because they were suitable to what is called colonial economy. If upon the transfer of power to Indians the State-power would not be exercised to blast the social foundation of the Imperialist State, the National State would be only

superficially different from it. The nature of the State does not change unless the social relations constituting its foundation are also changed. The established social relations remaining unaltered, the National State will have the same function as the Imperialist State, namely to maintain the social *status quo*.

Nationalist economy will hardly differ essentially from the colonial economy. The essence of colonial economy is capitalist trade on the basis of feudal exploitation, which deprives labour practically of its entire surplus produce. Colonial economy does not preclude development of capitalist production as far as that is possible within its basic limitation. The conditions for feudal exploitation result from the social relations which provided the foundation of the Imperialist State. They had previously existed in the country and were galvanised by the Imperialist State because they served the purpose of colonial economy. If those social relations were not abolished, they would constitute the foundation also of the National State, and the function of the National State would necessarily be to defend them. The National State would be as undemocratic as the Imperialist State. Transfer of power to Indians in the absence of any other purpose than to have power for its sake, will bring about only a superficial administrative change.

As against this theoretically substantiated critical view, it may be contended that, once power is transferred to the nationalist leaders, they will exercise it to establish a democratic Constitution. The contention implies that the power politics, as against social and democratic politics, of the nationalist parties (given the Two Nations theory, the Muslim League is also a nationalist party) is motivated with a revolutionary purpose; that the power wrested from British Imperialism will be used by the nationalist parties to reorganise Indian society economically because otherwise the political organisation of society, the State, cannot possibly be democratic.

To challenge this plausible contention, it is not necessary to doubt the sincerity of the nationalist leaders.

But it can be reasonably asked why, then, do they make a secret of their revolutionary purpose? Are they ashamed of owning such a purpose? Or are they afraid?

In the former case, they cannot be expected to act according to the purpose, when they will have power. One never willingly does

a thing he is ashamed of. Those who are ashamed of a revolutionary purpose cannot be revolutionaries. In the latter case, a second question arises : Afraid of whom? They are not afraid of British Imperialism, some of them having gone to the extent of inciting open rebellion against it, and all of them ready to do so, if possible. Nor could they be afraid of alienating the support of the masses, if they proclaimed their purpose of subverting social relations which mean economic slavery and cultural backwardness for the masses. If the nationalist parties had the revolutionary purpose, and if they had they would proclaim it, they would have kindled in the masses the consuming fire of the will to power, and with that formidable sanction themselves become irresistible.

Indeed, the power politics of the nationalist parties should have induced them to proclaim a revolutionary purpose to win the masses. They have tried to do so. Demagogy is the most appropriate weapon of power politics, and Indian nationalist leaders have made free use of it. But even in demagogy, they never went very far towards proclaiming a definite revolutionary purpose.

As then, the nationalist leaders have out of fear refrained from proclaiming their hypothetically revolutionary purpose, which they are expected to enforce when in possession of power, they must have been afraid neither of the British nor of the Indian masses. There remains only one other factor, which could have dictated prudence on their part. It is the Indian propertied classes, who are the beneficiaries, in the first place, of the established social relations. Evidently, with the support of the masses, constituting ninety-five p.c. of the population, the nationalist leaders could defy the opposition of the small minority. So it is really not fear which inhibits the supposed revolutionary purpose. It has not been proclaimed, because it is not there.

Since it cannot be proved even hypothetically that, in possession of power, the nationalist leaders would use it for establishing a State more liberating and progressive than the present State, transfer of power without any specification of the purpose for which it is desired, will not solve the problem of framing the Constitution of Free India. To drive the point home, emphasis must be laid on the fact that the present Government is not identical with the established State. It

only administers the State, which has its roots struck in the native social soil. Transfer of power to the nationalist politicians will lead to the replacement of the present nominally British Government by a National Government to administer the same State.

The political organisation of a society cannot be foreign. It is a corollary to the economic structure of the society, and as such it is rooted in the native soil. Therefore, it will continue even after the disappearance of the foreign Government which, by accident, administered it for a time.

As a matter of fact, the British conquerors did interfere, to some extent, with the economic structure of the country ; to that extent, the super-structure of political organisation also changed necessarily. But the fundamental social relations—the relations of classes—remained essentially unaffected. The National State to be established upon the transfer of power to the nationalist politicians will be reared upon those social relations, which spell economic bondage and cultural backwardness for the masses of the people. There will be only a change in the administrative machinery and its personnel, but none in the political organisation of society.

Why, then, talk of a new Constitution? The political organisation of a country cannot be changed without subverting its social basis. The making of a new Constitution is a revolution, and revolution is a radical readjustment of social relations. To demand transfer of power without bothering to specify, not to convince the enemy, but to enlighten the people, the purpose for which it will be used, betokens either political illiteracy or hides a purpose which is anything but liberating and progressive.

How will the Indian people as a whole be benefited in consequence of a transfer of power to the nationalist politicians, who will evidently use it for maintaining the social *status quo*? The foreign Government will disappear. But its function of administering the country on the basis of the established social relations, to the benefit of the propertied minority and detriment of the producing masses, will be taken over by a National Government.

The nationalist demand for transfer of power does not represent the progressive urge to give a new set of fundamental laws to guide the political administration of the country in future. And, without

formulating a new set of fundamental laws, to promulgate which power is needed, it is either sheer nonsense or deliberate deception to talk of a new Constitution. The making of a new Constitution is a revolutionary task. It presupposes a conscious revolutionary purpose.

But still let us proceed on the assumption that the nationalist leaders mean well, and when power is transferred to them, they will use it to promote popular welfare. Concretely, let us assume that the National Government is meant to be a democratic government, that, in other words, the nationalist leaders, once in possession of power, will pass it on to the people.

This assumption, with no more reliable foundation than wishful thinking and blind faith, promises parliamentary democracy. But still the fact remains that the nationalist parties and leaders have never clearly committed themselves even to that promise. If they wanted even such a formal political reorganisation of the country, there was no reason for them not to have declared the intention categorically. It is legitimate to ask why they did not do so. The answer is obvious. In that case, the demand for the transfer of power to themselves would lose all appearance of force. If they wanted transfer of power to the people even formally, they should insist upon a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage and its right to frame the new Constitution. It is not necessary for power to be transferred in two stages. The actual demand that power should be transferred to the nationalist leaders implies that they are entitled to possess it in trust for the people, and use it according to their discretion. So, the National Government would take over from the foreign Government, the administration of the established State including the old doctrine of trusteeship to guide the new administration. Such a National Government might establish benevolent paternalism; but it would not be a democratic government.

However, let us give the nationalist leaders the benefit of doubt, and assume that they will pass on power to the people, and the country will have a parliamentary democratic government. That assumption brings us up against the crucial question of constitution making in the contemporary world. Is political democracy possible

in the midst of economic inequality? Can economic inequality be removed by legislation without altering social relations, whilst society remains divided into the possessing and the dispossessed classes?

The lesson of modern history does not allow an affirmative answer to this crucial question. Indeed, history has pronounced its verdict, which must determine the political reorganisation of the world from now on. The verdict is decisively in the negative. It is the empirical verification of a theoretical proposition of politics—the science and art of civil administration. The theoretical proposition is that the State being the political organisation of society, reared upon a specific set of class relations, its function is to maintain those relations, and therefore the structure and policy of any government administering the established State is bound to be accordingly determined.

The form and expressions of economic inequality are not permanent. In the modern world, their crassness was mitigated by political democracy and equality before the law. When sovereign power of making laws came in the possession of the people as a whole, all inequality should disappear. The eighteenth century Europe set up that illusion, which kept the nineteenth century spell-bound. But experience burst the bubble. Economic inequality of the capitalist society, not only protected, but justified by the laws of the parliamentary State, mocked at political democracy. Sovereign power was formally vested in the people, but actually it rested with the propertied classes. Whoever dominated the economic life of the country, also controlled and dictated its political life.

The establishment of political democracy, nevertheless, was a progressive step. But the modern world could not stop there. It had to go forward or experience a retrogression. As the sovereign power, the *demos* was morally as well as legally entitled to abolish economic inequality. That meant readjustment on the established social relations. But the established State could not permit that. Its function was to maintain the social *status quo*. Governments, whether Conservative or Liberal or Labour or even Socialist, could only administer the given political organisation of society; in the political world, the will of the almighty political God—the State—must be done.

Reduced to an empty formality, in the midst of economic inequality, parliamentary democracy discredited itself. The *demos*

began to lose faith in the goddess of democracy. The rise and eventual triumph of Fascism marked the climax of the crisis of democracy. It became clear to all her intelligent devotees that democracy could not survive the crisis without transcending the narrow limits of parliamentarism, and becoming social democracy, that is, by abolishing economic inequality, the equality needed was not levelling, but equality of opportunity.

The Nationalist parties and leaders of India would completely disregard this lesson of contemporary history, while claiming the right to shape the future of four hundred million human beings. The disregard is evidenced by the demand for power without proclaiming how they will use it. The process of making a new Constitution must begin with such a proclamation. Constitution is not a scheme of administration. It is the fundamental law of a new State, and the object of the fundamental law should be not to maintain the social *status quo*, but to replace it by a new set of liberating and progressive relations.

The process of making a Constitution should begin with the proclamation of certain principles to govern social relations. To be practised, the principles are to be enacted as a body of fundamental laws—the Constitution of the new State. Power is required to make and enforce those laws.

CHAPTER X

NATION VERSUS PEOPLE

In *Social Contract*, Rousseau wrote : "The social spirit which would be the result of the Constitution would have to play the leading part in the creation of Constitution, and men, even before the establishment of the laws, would have to be that which they would become through these laws." The would-be makers of the Constitution of a free India should be guided by the advice of the prophet of the modern democratic State.

The absence of "the social spirit" is exactly the characteristic feature of nationalist power-politics. Without libertarian convictions, political parties and leaders, even if they claim to represent the people, can never conceive of liberating principles as the motive-force of the fundamental laws of the new State they wish to establish. And Nationalism has never been inspired by socially libertarian ideals, historically it being the political expression of the striving of a minority to seize power. Always and everywhere, Nationalism has operated as such. It cannot be different in India.

Indian Nationalists conveniently forget that Tagore characterised their cult as "organised selfishness." It may be fondly believed by them that the anathema was hurled only at the Nationalism of the materialistic Western peoples. But cultural Nationalism is a humbug. When Tagore was canonised as the National Poet and subsequently hailed by the High Priest of Nationalism as his *Gurudev*, perhaps he himself regretted his earlier views which, nevertheless, have earned for him a place amongst the modern seers. However the views remain recorded in history ; and can not be forgotten by those Indians who would honour the memory of the Poet instead of exploiting his position in the civilised world for a selfish purpose.

In 1917, Tagore wrote : "The idea of the nation is one of the most powerful anesthetics that man has ever invented. Under the

influence of its fumes, the whole people can carry out its systematic programme of the most virulent self-seeking without being in the least aware of its moral perversion—in fact, feeling dangerously resentful when it is pointed out.”

They speak grandeloquently of national interest, national honour and national spirit; behind all these high-sounding phrases are hidden the selfish interests of a minority. Drugged by the political religion, called Nationalism, a people becomes the Nation which claims and obtains the effacement of individuals composing the people. Rising, and capturing power on the authority of the people, the Nation becomes the enemy of popular freedom. The State being the political organisation of society, it is equalled with the nation. But it is a historical fact that political organisation of society became necessary when homogeneous human communities were divided into possessing and dispossessed classes, and ever since that time the State has been the instrument in the hand of the former to maintain its position of privilege. So, by identifying itself with the State, the Nation becomes antagonistic to the interests and freedom of the people. It is a totalitarian concept. Therefore nationalist politics cannot but be power-politics without any socially liberating principle.

The French Revolution celebrated the triumph of the concept of nation which, growing out of the ruins of the Holy Roman Empire had crystallised into a definite system of political thought since the Renaissance. Abbe Sieyes was the philosopher of the National State founded by the Great Revolution. He honestly identified the nation with the bourgeoisie. “What is the Third Estate? Everything.” Taking his cue from the learned priest, the Duke of Orleans paraphrased the famous proclamation of King Louis.XIV, and declared : “The Third Estate, that is the nation.”

The absolute monarch had identified the State with himself; his place was now occupied by the bourgeoisie—a minority of the people—who identified themselves with the nation; and the nation was identified with the State. From the absolute monarch, power passed on to the bourgeoisie. They had claimed power for the people, and captured it with the support of the people. Indeed, the power was captured by the people, but *for* the minority which had claimed it *for* them. After the transfer of power, the people, whose supreme sovereignty had been theoretically and ceremoniously proclaimed,

were left in the lurch. To justify that usurpation, Sieves told Napoleon that the latter could create a great nation because "We (the Third Estate) had most created the nation." The nation (the new name for the State) being their creation, the bourgeoisie were morally justified to appropriate it. It was their estate—to serve their purpose.

In India also, the nation-cult has been unfolding itself, and nationalist politics is being practised, strictly according to the historic pattern. The Congress claims to represent the Indian people, and with the cry for national independence has actually been able to captivate the emotion and enlist the support of the vocal section of the people. On that showing, which cannot stand a close scrutiny, it maintains that the democratic principle of self-determination will be practised by transferring power to a government which will command its support. This claim of a minority to usurp power, which should go to the people if India is to be free, is admitted by the present rulers of the country, only with certain reservations. The liberal and left opinion in Britain goes even farther and demands that the claim of the nationalist parties and politicians should be conceded without any reservation, and immediately.

Sir Stafford Cripps, for instance, in an interview to the New York paper "P.M.", (middle of Sept. 1944.) "to clarify American opinion", set forth "the official position of the British Government" as follows: "An offer was made to the Indian people in 1942, which is still open. That offer was for a new Constitution to be framed by the Indian people themselves."

The fact, however, is that the offer was made not to the Indian people, but to two nationalist parties. They claim to represent the entire people, and the offer of the British Government was admission of the claim. Even a democrat of the extreme leftist persuasion like Sir Stafford Cripps blissfully ignores the fact that the legislative assemblies, which were to frame the Constitution according to the offer communicated through him, represented only thirteen per cent of the people. The thirteen per cent is identified with the whole. In reality, the nationalist parties, indeed, the entire nationalist movement, represent only the striving for political power of a small minority (the Third Estate) which has been clever enough to exploit the assiduously cultivated nationalist sentiment for its own purpose. The Third Estate wants to be everything. The slogan of

national independence, which carefully and consistently avoided anything concrete about "the kingdom of heaven to come", has become a toy for the people. Napoleon once said cynically : "Give the people a toy; they will pass the time with it and allow themselves to be led, provided that the final goal is cleverly hidden from them."

Indian nationalist leaders may or may not have read to learn their lesson from the history of Nationalism in other countries. But the logic of history has been operating through their intuition. Acting according to Napoleon's injunction, as if by clairvoyance, they have cleverly hidden their goal from the masses, having chosen for the purpose the most effective means. The nationalist appeal to the masses has been religious; the educated middle class has been deluded with the glittering doctrine of "India's spiritual mission." With this appeal to the superstition of the ignorant and to the inferiority complex of frustrated romanticism, a moneyed minority has succeeded in making their will identical with "the will of the nation." The nationalist politicians have thus become the high priests of the goddess nation whose will is to be interpreted by them, as the will of the old God used to be, and still is, interpreted in India by the priests. The National State will be the temple of the new Goddess. It will be built at the cost of the people, and afterwards the people will have to offer sacrifices to the enshrined Goddess. The beneficiaries of the triumphant cult of Nationalism will be the political priesthood, who as such will be the keeper of the Temple of the Goddess of Nation.

Therefore, nationalist politics cannot possibly have any social content, and the Constitution of the National State is bound to be a reinforced legal framework of the social *status quo*. As such a Constitution precludes all libertarian principles, the controversy on the future Constitution of India necessarily does not touch the fundamental issues of politics—the science and art of civil administration. Without a liberating social purpose, politics is bound to degenerate into power-politics. Therefore, nationalist politics, no matter by which persons or which parties it is practised, is power-politics—the striving of a minority to capture power, fraudulently in the name of the people, to use it to promote their selfish interests at the cost of the freedom and welfare of the people.

Nationalism leads to the glorification of the State as a metaphysical depositary of power—Hegel's "God on Earth". Placed

above the people, as an abstract metaphysical power, the Nation logically becomes identical with the State, as conceived by the philosophers of Nationalism from Rousseau to Hegel.

Therefore, Nationalism necessarily culminates in Fascism which carries the metaphysical conception of State to its absurd climax. Fascism lays bare the totalitarian essence of the concept of nation, as something distinct from the people—a collectivity which exists and thrives at the cost of the individuals composing it.

In order to be great, a nation demands sacrifice on the part of the people. The last word of nationalist metaphysics was pronounced by Mussolini. He exclaimed : “Everything for the State. Nothing outside of it. Nothing against it.” Because the State is identical with the nation, and the will of the nation must prevail upon the will of the people. The State alone can express the will of the nation. The people must bend before that will of the “God on Earth”.

The nationalist cult of a metaphysical State deprives politics of all libertarian social content, and political practice becomes use of State-power to suppress the people for promoting the interest of a powerful minority which controls the State thanks to their domination of the economic life of society. Therefore, triumphant Nationalism (which appears as Fascism in our time) forgets the pious wish of its early prophet and blatantly declares that “all social politics is unspeakable stupidity.”

In his “Confessions” romantic Rousseau had visualised the function of the Nation-State as follows :

“I found that politics was the first means for furthering morals ; that the character of a people will always evolve according to the kind of Government it has. In this respect, it seemed to me that the great question concerning the best form of State can be reduced to this : How must the government be constituted to form a people into the most virtuous, the most enlightened, the widest, in one word, the best people, in the fullest sense.

But the intellectual leaders of National Socialist Germany which represented the culmination of the cult of Nationalism in Europe, condemned social politics as “unspeakable stupidity”. Professor Ernst Horneffer of the University of Giessen reached the remarkable conclusion with the following argument : “The danger of the social movement can only be obviated by a division among the masses.

Life's table is occupied to the very last place, and consequently industry can never guarantee to its employees anything more than their existence. This is an unbreakable natural law. Hence all social politics is unspeakable stupidity."

On another occasion, the learned Professor who was always very much at home in the company of German industrial magnates, expounded the theory of *the nation against the people*—a theory which logically results from the cult of Nationalism, more shamelessly. In an essay on "Socialism and the Death Struggle of German Industry", he wrote :

"I maintain that the economic condition of the workers, basically and essentially, by and large, can in reality not be changed. The workers will once and for all have to be content with their economic condition, that is, with a wage only sufficient for the most necessary, the most urgent, the most indispensable, requirements of life, in fact, barely sufficient to sustain life. A fundamental change in the workers' economic status, their rise to an essentially different state of economic welfare, can never happen ; this is a desire impossible of fulfilment for all time."

Nor is this an extravagance of fanatical National-Socialists. The roots of this doctrine can be traced to the romantic pioneers of Nationalism in Germany. The English utopian Socialist, Robert Owen, sought the support of the romantic pioneers of German Nationalism for his plans of reform. One of them, Gentz, replied : "We do not wish to make the great mass wealthy and independent; how could we then rule them?"

As a matter of fact, almost all the romantic pioneers of German Nationalism, not excluding even Fichte, politically landed in the camp of reaction. Some of them even went over to clericalism. The testimony in this respect comes from no less a critic than George Brandes. In his book on the Romantic School in Germany he wrote : "In politics it was they who guided the Vienna Congress and drew up the manifesto (Karlsbad Declaration) for the abrogation of liberty of thought among the people."

In India, Nationalism cannot possibly have any less disastrous consequence for the people. Nationalist politicians demanding power on behalf of the people refuse to declare the purpose for which they want power simply because they cannot lay their cards on the table, and yet claim to represent the people. Therefore, they can only practise politics.

The striking similarity of the above quotation from the German Nazi Professor with the practical implication of the divine doctrine of the prophet of Indian Nationalism cannot be missed by any critical mind. Gandhi preaches that suffering and sacrifice are the conditions for national independence. The Nazi Professor preached the same doctrine, only without any cant. Having suffered and sacrificed for the triumph of the nation, the people must for ever remain on the subsistence level, so that the nation could prosper and be great. Gandhi's moral cant justifies the bourgeois economists' "iron law of wages" according to which the standard of living of the toiling masses, constituting the overwhelming majority of the people, can never rise above the subsistence level.

The purpose of nationalist politics thus is anti-social. It is antagonistic to the welfare and freedom of the people. The fundamental laws of the National State will not be socially libertarian. Their object will be to maintain the social *status quo*. The National State will be an engine to coerce, oppress and tyrannise the people. It will be the veritable Leviathan.

The guarantee against the danger is to replace power-politics by social politics. The voice of the people must be raised as against the will of the minority passed on as the "will of the nation". Nationalism always pretended to do so. When democracy was still struggling for recognition, "sovereignty of the nation" appeared to be identical with the sovereignty of the people. But in course of time, the fraudulent doctrine of the "sovereignty of the nation" enabled minorities to usurp the sovereignty of the people. Representing the will of a powerful minority, the Nation became a totalitarian concept. Nationalism and democracy became antithetical.

There are trustful souls who imagine Indian Democracy rising out of the clash between Nationalism and Imperialism. Nationalism having no liberating social purpose, the clash cannot possibly produce such a revolutionary result. Nationalism does not propose to destroy the social foundation of the political organisation of the country.

But simultaneously with the superficial clash between Nationalism and Imperialism, there is developing a far more far-reaching clash between the nation and the people : between an abstraction and a reality. This clash is pregnant with great social possibilities. Its outcome will determine the future of the country.

CHAPTER XI

CULTURAL NATIONALISM

No better guiding principle of social practice has been formulated since Protagoras declared, "Man is the measure of all things."

Politics is a form of social practice. A political concept which permits measuring of values, whether spiritual or temporal, moral or material, by any other standard than the freedom, welfare and progress of the component units of society, cannot be liberating or conducive to culture.

Man or the individual, of course, is not to be conceived as an isolated social atom. Such a man or individual, like the physical atom, is an abstract conception. Nevertheless society is a creation of man, and is meant to serve the purpose of promoting man's welfare and progress. Therefore, if political society dethrones man from his central place, and reduces him to a mere cog in the wheel of the State, politics becomes an anti-social practice; and society being a community of individuals, formed with no other purpose than their mutual protection, whatever is anti-social is antagonistic to human welfare, it is inhuman. No culture—that is unfolding of the finer—moral and spiritual—potentialities of human existence, is possible within the framework of such a political society.

Placing an abstraction (nation) above the reality of the people, Nationalism logically does not admit this fundamental principle of social practice. The people is composed of individuals. Man enters into a collective co-operative existence; but by doing so, he does not forfeit his individual being. A collective being does not preclude or eclipse the existence of its components. The relation between the man and the people is social. Only in the context of that relation, man can prosper materially, grow morally and progress culturally. The State being the political organisation of society, the relation between the individual and the collectivity should not essentially

change in the political society. The State should be coincident, if not identical, with the people. But in a political society, reared on the basis of the cult of Nationalism, the State is identified with the nation. The reality of the people, composed of individuals, is eclipsed by an abstraction. If the nation was identical with the people, it would not be necessary to have two names for the selfsame thing. Indeed, the historical fact is that the concept of nation was invented to serve the purpose of a minority to usurp the sovereignty of the people, and capture power, fraudulently, on behalf of the people. Nation is a political entity, whereas culture is a social achievement. It is to be therefore associated with the concept of people which is a social concept.

As an abstract concept, nation is not composed of individuals. It is an indivisible whole. A metaphysical category cannot be constructed out of ponderable physical entities. There is no relation between the nation and the individual. Man ceases to be the measure of things in a political society based on the cult of Nationalism. In such a society, therefore, political practice cannot have any social or moral purpose.

National freedom or greatness is not to be measured by the social position, moral uplift or cultural progress of the individual. The metaphysical cannot be subjected to physical measurements. As a matter of fact, all throughout history, the efflorescence of so-called national cultures has often taken place on the sordid foundation of moral degradation, and national grandeur has meant economic slavery of the people. Therefore, to associate culture with Nationalism, to maintain that cultural advance of a people is promoted by the National State, is historically incorrect. Cultural Nationalism is a humbug.

Culture is a product of social environments which afford man the freedom and opportunity to develop all his potentialities. Cultural values are created by individuals living under social conditions which liberate man from moral and material limitations to his being and becoming. Social evolution qualifies man to produce cultural values. The advantages of social evolution in the past were monopolised by ruling minorities. Therefore, as a rule, cultural contributions were made by individuals belonging to the privileged classes. But only

free souls can create abiding cultural values; they may physically belong to one particular class, or geographically to a particular country; spiritually, they transcend all social or territorial limitations. True cultural values are universal. They do not bear the stamp of any class or nation. All cultural contributions are the common heritage of humanity.

The totalitarian concept of nation being a negation of the individual, Nationalism cannot possibly promote true culture. Cultural values being universal, national culture is bound to be a counterfeit. In order to be national, a culture must be cast into a particular pattern, which can only be arbitrarily prescribed. Freedom of the creative spirit of man disappears, or is suppressed. Spiritual regimentation is no culture. The metaphysical concept of nation, expressing itself through the State, corresponds with the will of the ruling minority. The patterns of national culture are also set by that will, the object being to circumscribe the human spirit by conventions of conformism. The selfish will of a privileged minority invents a national genius, which demands and receives the capitulation of the creative genius of the human spirit. The latter is followed only such forms of expression as serves the purpose of fortifying the privileged position of the ruling minority. Those forms are necessarily narrow, and stifle the human spirit. Dictated cultural conformism debases man spiritually, perverts him morally and stultifies emotionally. That regimentation, torture, perversion, vulgarisation of learning, intelligence and emotion is called national culture.

Cultural Nationalism appears in its purest and most extravagant form when a people is subjected to foreign rule. In that case, national consciousness is created by tall talks about past glory and great cultural contributions. This type of cultural Nationalism reached its climax in Germany, where the establishment of the National State was delayed until after the middle of the nineteenth century. Hatred for France, which country at that period was the leader of modern culture and the spearhead of revolution, was the motive force of cultural Nationalism in Germany.

Indian Nationalism also claims to be cultural. Therefore, it is not an accident that it is cast in the pattern made in Germany. Racial

animosity is also its motive force. The base sentiment precludes the humanist universal spirit associated with culture.

The "Ramraj" or the "Vikram Era" of the Indian nationalist's imagination is reminiscent of the "Verlorene Heimat" (the lost home) of the German Romanticists of the early nineteenth century. Spiritual perfection and complete oneness of life was believed to have been attained by the extraordinarily gifted people who inhabited the country along the Rhine, which became the Ganges of German cultural Nationalism. Myths and legends were re-written as history. The cultural Nationalism culminated in the doctrine that, because of their past glory and achievements, which were going to be repeated on an even larger scale, by the resurrected German nation, the latter was destined to be the saviour and leader of the world.

Some of the Romanticists, notably Fichte and Schelling, went to the extent of declaring that the Germans were a "chosen people" with a divine mission from Providence. Fichte called the Germans the "Urvolk"—the original people from whom all the other branches of the human race had descended. The poetic philosopher of German Nationalism also declared that the primitive people living in the "Verlorene Heimat" spoke the "Ursprache"—a "language which from the first sound uttered by the people has without a break developed from the actual common life of the people". From these fantastic presuppositions, Fichte's romantic extravagance reached the conclusion that only an "Urvolk" possessing an "Ursprache" was capable of penetrating intellectual growth and developing a culture.

These apparently harmless romantic extravagances of cultural Nationalism fanned the flame of race hatred—an invaluable asset of political Nationalism. Fichte declared that "to have character and to be German, are indubitably synonymous". Nationalism was not slow to draw the conclusion that, therefore, other peoples, particularly the French, could have no character. Fichte himself elaborated this fantastic dictum of cultural chauvinism.

On the flimsy and frivolous foundation that the French language had no synonym for a particular German word (*Gemuet*), Fichte constructed the doctrine that the French were sensual and materialistic, whereas the Germans represented the profoundest spirit of Christianity and were possessed of the moral virtues of inner

chastity and loyalty, which resulted from truly religious souls. Ascribing cunning and guile to the French character, Fichte carried cultural Nationalism to a condemnation of the "spirit of enlightenment" which he described as "crassest free-thought and infidelity".

Nationalism, thus, turned against its own cultural origin. By challenging the morality of the temporal power of the Church, the Renaissance Movement promoted the rise of National States. Culturally, the Renaissance Movement culminated in the spirit of Enlightenment, which found such a rich expression in eighteenth century France. Nationalism finding its crassest expression in Germany declared war on the spirit of Enlightenment.

In his famous "Addresses to the German Nation", Fichte passionately preached the doctrine of "the world historical mission of the Germans". Declaring that the German nation was destined to be the "mother and reconstructor of humanity", the prophet of cultural chauvinism exclaimed : "Among all the newer nations, it is you in whom the germ of human perfection is most definitely contained, and to whom progress in the development thereof is entrusted." The "war of liberation," however, was waged under the banner of the absolute feudal monarchist Prussian State, backed up by Tzarist Russia. And it ended in the establishment of the Prussian aristocracy in power.

Cultural Nationalism meant cultural reaction, and it fanned the fire of race hatred, which base emotion was fully exploited by the upper classes to capture power in the name of the people, deceived and misled by romantic patriotism. Culture is a human heritage; cultural values are universal. They spread across political frontiers. Therefore, Nationalism is bound to be antagonistic to culture. The extravagances of Fichte's cultural Nationalism which only helped Prussian chauvinism and inspired the pioneers of Fascism, drove Goethe to the painful conclusion that

"NATIONAL ANIMOSITY IS A PECULIAR
THING : IN THE LOWEST DEGREE OF
CIVILISATION

IT IS ALWAYS STRONGEST AND MOST VIRULENT"

German Nationalism not only declared war upon cultural progress because it had taken place in France, but disowned the greatest

Germans of the time. Therefore, the poet Heine protested against it : "It began as a shabby, loutish, unwashed opposition to a mental attitude, which is the noblest, the holiest that Germany has created; that is, against that humanity, against that general human fraternisation, against that cosmopolitanism which our great spirits Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, Jean Paul—and all Germans of culture have always venerated."

After Fichte's death, Ludwig Jahn became the spiritual leader of German patriotism. By his more intelligent colleagues, he was characterised as a "grimacing conceited fool". Yet, he became the idol of the German youth and received honorary degrees from one University after another. It was so very undeserved an honour that even a conservative nationalist historian like Treitschke remarked : "It amounted to a social disease, that the sons of an enlightened people could venerate a noisy barbarian as their leader." Indian Nationalism has also produced similarly incongruous phenomena. Cultural Nationalism degrading the cultural level of the people is, thus, an experience of history.

The Fascists glorified Fichte as the true prophet of genuine Germanism. His "Addresses to the Nation" were to be kept in every home in Nazi Germany as the textbook of patriotism, which was fed on the superstitious belief in the historic mission of the Germans. This romantic doctrine, originally invented by Luther and then popularised by Fichte's eloquence, ultimately enabled Hitler and his gang to sway the German people to submit themselves enthusiastically to a brutal dictatorship, which would stamp out the concept of individual freedom, developed through centuries since the Renaissance, as foreign and antagonistic to the spirit of Germany. Fascist demagoguery against Entente Imperialism only helped the German ruling class to enlist the services of Nationalism to beat down the revolution.

These experiences of history should dispel the illusion that Nationalism, developing in India remarkably on the classical German pattern, can lead to any different result. Cultural Nationalism as an academic proposition is humbug. For practical purposes, it is positively dangerous. It hides the base lust of a minority to capture power and establish its domination which is the essence of Nationalism.

CHAPTER XII

POWER POLITICS VERSUS SOCIAL POLITICS

All controversy about the future Constitution of India, as of any other country, is pointless unless the purpose of politics is theoretically clarified. The framing of a new Constitution is not a legislative act. It is a political practice and no political practice without a political theory.

But the theoretical foundation of nationalist politics has remained, rather has been deliberately kept, shrouded in a confusion of vague idealism. The social character of the future National State has neither been defined, nor is it visualised in a realistic perspective of the relation of classes underlying nationalist politics. Therefore, it has proved so very difficult to reach an agreement about the Constitution of the future National State. The architect cannot build unless he knows what he wants to construct. No agreement is possible amongst people working at cross-purposes.

Nationalism of our time has no social purpose. Its motive force is racial animosity, which is glorified or rationalised as a conflict of culture. And the so-called cultural Nationalism, in its turn, aggravates the racial bias of nationalist politics. The fiction of racial and cultural unity is dramatised to distract people's attention from the facts of social inequality.

To remove these facts of social inequality progressively has been the purpose of politics throughout the ages. A studied disregard for, or callous condonation of, social inequalities being the characteristic feature of racial Nationalism, it cannot have a libertarian social purpose. And political practice without a social purpose cannot have a theoretical foundation. It is like a castle built on shifting sand and, as such, bound to collapse and crumble. The guarantee against that tragedy of Nationalism is its hidden foundation of a socially reactionary, indeed, anti-social purpose. An implicit theoretical

bias of nationalist political practice logically results from that purpose.

But without popular support, the artificial structure of national unity cannot appear to be imposing. Therefore, the theoretical foundation of nationalist politics must be kept hidden in a confusion deliberately created by the demagogy of a vague idealism. This serves the purpose of deceiving the people. The perennial social urge of revolt against oppression is canalised in a different direction. Nationalism transforms it into race hatred. Racial politics cannot be social politics, and politics without a social purpose degenerated into power politics.

The sole purpose of nationalist political practice, therefore, is to wrest power from the foreigner. The fundamental question about the social character of the National State is not even raised, because as soon as that is done, the artificial structure of national unity will crumble. The nationalist need for an artificial united front precludes the formulation of a programme of social reconstruction. Politics without such a programme, however, is a mere scramble of power.

Committed to a concrete programme of social reconstruction, a political party can secure the support of a majority of the people for the proposed Constitution of a new State which is to be established to enforce the programme. The insurmountable difficulty in reaching an agreement about the future Constitution of the country results from the fact that the nationalist parties work at cross-purposes, none of them being committed to a programme of social reconstruction.

Without a progressive social purpose, their politics, however, is not really purposeless. They all have skeletons in their cupboards. But a glimpse of those macabre pictures of independence or national freedom will disillusion the people. And without popular support, an agreement amongst leaders on their respective anti-social purposes could not be paraded as national unity. Therefore, the skeletons must remain in the cupboards to be brought out after the capture of power. Meanwhile, Constitution-making should be nothing more serious than an anticipatory division of the loaves and fishes of power.

Nationalism is not a political theory. In our time, it is a racial bias. Even in the past, when Nationalism was associated with

progressive and social-revolutionary movements in Europe, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, its triumph often had a reactionary result. Those ups and downs might be regarded as dialectics of history. But it is idle to justify them *post factum* as *necessary* sequences of events. As actual events, they are justified by the simple fact that they happened. This objective view of history, however, does not preclude the scientific judgment that something different might just as well have happened. There is no set pattern of social evolution. Human behaviour is complex to the extent of being almost incalculable. The mathematics of social science (history is a social science) cannot be operated except in the realm of probability. Historical Determinism should not become a pseudo-scientific justification of the venerable prejudice of fatalism.

Historically, the movement for the establishment of National States as against the universal temporal power of the Catholic Church coincided with the growth of social forces striving for democratic freedom. But not until the nineteenth century were the newly established National States as a rule democratic. And even in the nineteenth century, the most rampant nationalist movement in Europe led to the establishment of a feudal-militarist monarchy.

The *per se* democratic movement was an expression of class struggle within the respective countries themselves. It was strongest and most fruitful in Britain and France, where National States had been established long ago. In both the countries it was a civil war. In France, it went to the extent of replacing the National Monarchist State by a Democratic State committed to Cosmopolitanism. German Nationalism was a reaction to that cosmopolitan spirit of triumphant Democracy. The cosmopolitan spirit of the French Revolution is not to be confounded with Napoleonism, although the latter also did serve as the vehicle of the former's message of social revolution.

The philosophical and cultural foundation of the democratic political practice of the French Revolution was cosmopolitan. The ideological pioneers of the Great Revolution were not Frenchmen; they were Europeans inspired by the universal spirit of modern culture, and as such they called themselves Humanists. They undermined the moral foundation of the National State and also of

the European feudal society buttressed on the spiritual domination of Christianity, Protestant as well as Catholic. France returned to Nationalism under the banner of political and cultural reaction against the liberating onslaught of the French Revolution. Conservative Catholics like Royer-Collard, Chateaubriand and de Maistre replaced Voltaire, Diderot, Holbach, d'Alembert, as her intellectual leaders. Nationalism was not an unmixed evil, in our time, being primarily dominated by the base sentiment of racial animosity, it is bound to be socially reactionary.

A false appreciation of the social possibility of nationalist politics results from the confusion of the doctrine of self-determination with democracy. There is no necessary connection between national freedom and self-determination in the democratic sense; nor does self-determination of nations necessarily lead to democratic freedom. That is the experience of the inter-war period of European history. Not one of the National States established by the Versailles Treaty according to the Wilsonian doctrine of self-determination was democratic. Not even the veteran democrat Masaryk's Czechoslovakia was quite an exception. The constitutional autonomy of national minorities within the framework of the National State created no guarantee against the latter becoming an instrument in the hands of a privileged minority to oppress the majority of the people belonging to all the nationalities. It became also clear that there was no necessary connection between self-determination and democracy; and that self-determination without democracy was a slogan of nationalist power-politics.

A comparative study of the Constitutions of the National States created by the Versailles Treaty including the liberal democratic Czechoslovakia, and of those of the German and Spanish Republics, reveals the difference between power-politics and social politics. The former are cumbersome legal documents composed with the sole purpose of placing privileged minorities in power to rule over the peoples in the name of the nation—the metaphysical authority of power-politics. They created political organisations of society leaving the problems of social relations outside the jurisdiction of the fundamental law of the State. Indeed, society was not reorganised; only nominally democratic authorities were created, and formally

democratic laws were to be given with the undemocratic purpose of maintaining the social *status quo*. The purpose of politics was attainment of power in order to reinforce social reaction, or conservatism, at the best.

As against the Constitution of the National States, the Weimar Constitution and the Constitution of the Spanish Republic were framed with the purpose of creating legal sanctions for a reconstruction of society. These two latter Constitutions were the result of political practice on the basis of a programme which postulated capture of power with a clearly stated and boldly proclaimed social purpose. Both these Constitutions were subsequently subverted by Nationalism, which condemned and destroyed democratic freedom as antagonistic to national unity and national culture. That is the most damaging commentary on Nationalism in our time. And that commentary is the judgment of history. Failing to learn from it, a country will only come to grief.

Reactionary Nationalism in the colonial countries has of late been embellished by the pseudo-Marxist theory of anti-Imperialism. This latter theory is believed to have a social foundation : The colonial people's struggle for national freedom is an integral part of the proletarian world revolution. Experience, however, has belied this elaborately constructed theory. Triumphant or semi-successful nationalist movements in the colonial countries, or in countries which are believed to have been kept in backwardness by modern Imperialism, have invariably tended towards Fascism, instead of showing the least inclination to be honest allies of Democracy, not to mention proletarian world revolution. The history of China and Turkey is typical. It sets the pattern of the reactionary power-politics of Nationalism. Between China and Turkey, the latter's political practice has had more of social purpose, because its Nationalism was less racial than that of the former.

The pseudo-Marxist theory of anti-Imperialism (anything purely negative is always sterile) panders to the base sentiment of race hatred, and consequently plays into the hands of social reaction. The doctrine of united anti-Imperialist Front divorces political practice from the context of social conflicts, and making it an expression of racial animosity, helps the upper-class minority to use the people as

a pawn in the game of power-politics. Providing nationalist power-politics with a pseudo-theoretical foundation, anti-Imperialism helps Nationalism to hide its reactionary social purpose. The misalliance with Nationalism compels Marxism to betray itself. Marxist politics is social politics. It is practised with a progressive, revolutionary, social purpose. For Marxists, politics is a social practice; the theoretical foundation of Marxist political practice is social. Nationalist politics, on the contrary, has no reference to social problems. Indeed, it deliberately ignores these problems, being concerned only with wresting from the foreigners the power to rule the country.

Yet, to solve social problems is the purpose of political practice. Nationalist politics attaches supreme importance to the change of rulers. It does not even raise the more important question : How will the country be ruled? But unless that fundamental question of politics is raised, all controversy about the future Constitution becomes idle. Because, the Constitution is to be framed precisely to answer this question posed by history, if not by nationalist politicians. If the question is begged, how can it be answered? Nationalists want power not to answer a question posed by history, but to silence it. That is power politics.

The question, who will rule the country, will be automatically answered as soon as the other question—how the country will be ruled,—is answered. An answer to this question, acceptable to the vast majority of the people, presupposes social purpose of politics,—a libertarian political theory to guide political practice. The country should be so ruled as to guarantee the greatest good to the greatest number. Whoever will commit themselves, without any reserve, to this social principle of political practice, will make the best rulers of the country.

As benevolence on the part of the privileged and powerful few is a lie or illusion, exposed by the experience of history, only the rule of the people can guarantee the greatest good to the greatest number. Therefore, if the country is to be really free, not only independent of Britain, then its future Constitution must subvert the established social relations, within which limitations, the people can never be the sovereign power, even if formally enfranchised. That

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is the experience of modern history. The social organisation of this country being more oppressive, because more backward, will make the experience more bitter.

All controversy about the future Constitution of the country is bound to be sterile as long as the fundamental constitutional issue of social reconstruction is not joined. The nationalist parties and politicians avoid the fundamental issue because social reconstruction needed for the welfare and progress of the people is not the purpose of their politics. They can never agree about the future Constitution. The question, therefore, should be referred to the people. That approach to the problem of the future Constitution can be made only by a party committed to social politics as against power politics—for whom the purpose of politics is not to usurp power, but to release forces for a social reconstruction. Such a party can lay all its cards on the table. It has no skeleton in the cup-board. Its purpose being identical with the perennial social urge of progress, it can outline a political organisation of society which will be hailed by majority as the picture of their freedom.

CHAPTER XIII

THE POLITICAL CHURCH

Describing Gandhi's journey back to Segaoon after the breakdown of his negotiations with Jinnah, the Special Correspondent of a Congress press organ wrote :

"It was as if a travelling temple was being received at very station by hundreds of votaries eager to pay their respect and offer their worship. No one appeared to bother for a moment that the Gandhi-Jinnah talks had failed. Everyone was happy that Gandhiji with his unerring instinct had done the right thing. Nothing can abet his popularity."

Further depicting how the train was stopped at a level crossing for a third class passenger to get in with the help of a ladder the Correspondent wrote :

"If anyone cares to take a tip from me, I would advise him to snatch it (the ladder) away next time he sees it. For you never can tell the history and sanctity that go with it. Even to-day, provincial and national disputes arise over the relics of saints and the teeth of Buddha. It is a ladder of destiny."

Gandhi's hold on the mass mind is the sanction of the nationalist power politics. The sanction of that sanction is mass ignorance, superstition and spiritual backwardness. These ultimate sanctions of nationalist power politics are guarded by mediaeval conditions of life, feudal-patriarchal social relations and cultural stagnation. The generous donors of the Congress aspire to build up a national-capitalist State on that foundation of social slavery and spiritual degradation of the masses.

The Congress has become the Church of a new religion, call it Nationalism or Patriotism, as you like. The Mahatma is the Pope of the political Church, with his Cardinals and an army of priests and monks, whose task is to exact from the superstitious mob the tribute

of blind devotion to the calculating and cleverly publicised saint. That stage-managed demonstration of the ignorance of the politically illiterate masses, illiterate because they are deliberately not allowed to learn the ABC of politics, is the token of the popularity of the Congress.

As the Catholic Church in the middle-Ages, the Congress also claims universal sovereignty over the whole of India. Totalitarianism is the counter-part of the claim to universal domination. Therefore, the political creed of the Congress has become "One Country, One Party, One Leader".

Having suffered defeat after defeat in the political field, the latest being the failure of the Pope to compel Jinnah to accept thankfully the crown on a 'maimed, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan' "as the gift of the Holy Father, the Congress is falling back on its prepared positions of defence. There it will reinforce itself by drawing upon the reserves of the religious predisposition and credulity of the ignorant masses. An organisation which would draw its strength from the tradition of cultural backwardness and spiritual servitude of the masses, cannot be the instrument for winning freedom for the people. Nevertheless, as a political Church, it may still deceive the blind votaries and retain their apparent support for the power politics of Nationalism.

Before leaving for Bombay to pit his wiles against the wits of Jinnah, the Mahatma outlined his plans for a reorganisation and revitalisation of the officers corps of the Army of God. Congressmen operating on the political field are only lay-brethren of the Church, although many of them pretend to be ordained priests. Because, in that role, they can make their demagoguery more effective. The Pope, however, relies more on the monastic orders—the Gandhi Seva Sangh, the Spinners' Association, the Village Industries Association and the Harijan Humbug Limited. Most probably, another order will now be created to administer the Kasturba Fund.

The plan of reorganisation seems to be to amalgamate all these different monastic Orders of the Mahatma in one powerful Brotherhood of political Jesuits, who will work concertedly with the single purpose of establishing the hold of the Church on the mass mind. Only, the appeal is not to the mind, but to superstition—the blind faith in the Mahatma's power to make miracles.

Primitive emotions and irrational predisposition are fostered at the cost of intelligence and reason. Therefore, it is misleading to say that Gandhi has any hold on the mass mind. The popularity of a saint, be he a genuine psycho-pathological phenomenon or an imposter, presupposes backward mental development of the masses. It results from an appeal to blind faith, which precludes any rational mental behaviour. The amalgamated monastic order, therefore, will function with the object of consolidating the spiritual power of the Pope to reinforce his claim to totalitarian temporal sovereignty, so that in due time he may resume the struggle for political power.

The political Church will have to be more militant than ever. The struggle for temporal power henceforth will have to be waged on two fronts. The power politics of Nationalism will have to be practised against two enemies. The Pope's defeat in the battle of Mount Pleasant has created this difficult situation. There seems to be hardly any chance for the Pope Militant of the Indian political Church to bring his Barbarossa to Conossa. Nevertheless, the Pope did not take defeat lying down. Throwing the creed of non-violence to winds, he declared "war to the knife", should the apostate persist in refusing to admit the universal sovereignty of the Church of the new religion of totalitarian Nationalism.

Accept the suzerainty, if not actual sovereignty, of my Church, and we shall divide the spoils; otherwise, brothers will become enemies. That declaration of war after the comedy of brotherly embrace ended in a tragedy, has to be acted upon. The army of totalitarian Nationalism, demoralised and disintegrating, in consequence of the defeat on the racial front, must be regrouped and re-equipped before the war, this time on two fronts—racial as well as communal (religious)—could be resumed.

But the Church won't allow its army to be inspired with ideals and armed with weapons which could give it a new hope and new courage. The army will always be a mob, actuated only with the blind faith in the Mahatma's power to make miracles, moving under its own inertia of ignorance, mesmerised by the antics of a Mountebank and hypnotised by the demagoguery of the flock of monks, ordained priests and lay-brothers of the Church.

Ideas and ideals which move the masses in a purposeful political action, shake them out of their traditional spirit of dependence,

glorified as devotion to the Mahatma, transform the superstitious, spiritually enslaved mob into a human fraternity fired with the will to freedom, cannot be allowed to defile the sanctity of the political Church. Tamper with the superstition of the masses, appeal to reason and intelligence which are the natural gifts of any human being, make them in the least conscious of the urge for progress, and the foundation of Mother Church will be shaken and she will crumble before long. Religion is opium for the people. When a religion is made out of politics, or politics is debased to the level of religion, it operates as an even stronger drug.

On his return to the Holy See,—the Pope of the Indian political Church is quietly elaborating his plans of future operations. While the monastic Order, which always functions *sub rosa* like the Jesuits in the Middle Ages, is preparing to spread its tentacles of pseudo-humanitarianism to catch souls for Doctor Kaligari's Cabinet, the lay-brothers are receiving order to fall back upon the "constructive programme". The object is to discourage searching of hearts and any political thinking. The process of demoralisation is to be checked by putting emphasis on the litanies and rituals of the Church.

In a letter to the apostate British Gandhist Edward Thompson, the Papal Prime Minister fulminates : "You are ready to help your Government diplomacy by encouraging extremists and unpractical dunderheads by timely mouthing of the language of unmodified democracy and revolution."

That is the anathema pronounced by the political Church Militant. Defeated in the war on the racial front, frustrated in the stratagem of power politics on the communal front, the offensive will now be taken on the social front. The political Church Militant proposes to mobilise the army of counter-revolution to wage a civil war on the home front. That is the "constructive programme" which will be offered to defeated Nationalism.

CHAPTER XIV

PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY

Political thought, ever since the days of Plato has theorised about the Ideal State,—a political organisation of society in which the relations between man and man would be governed by justice.

Throughout the Antiquity and the Middle Ages, political thought was dominated by abstract notions which served either the harmless purpose of building utopias or the sinister design of hiding the concrete realities of life. Plato was not quite the utopain that he had been made out by many uncritical historians of political philosophy. Nevertheless, his doctrine of the Ideal State rested on a postulate which still holds good. For him, justice was not a vague conception. His definition of the notion of justice, which confounded thought throughout ages, was bitterly criticised by his opponents, particularly the Sophists. But Plato did give a definition of the notion of justice, which set a concrete ideal for politics. Justice is good life; to establish good life, therefore, is the purpose of politics. In other words, an Ideal State is that which establishes good life.

This clear purpose of politics could be confused so long as life was divided into two compartments—spiritual and temporal. What appeared to be bad for the temporal life, for life on this earth, was not the criterion of good life. There was a life after—the spiritual life. The goodness of that life could not be measured by the standards of the life on this earth. Bad life on this earth could after all be the condition for a good life after. In other words, the hope of a good life afterz justified a miserable life on this earth.

Political thought was developed in this direction by astute theologians in Europe as well as in India. Thomas Aquinas was a landmark in the history of political thought. He was a European by accident of birth. The political philosophy of the ancients, which started not from the dictum of the Sophist Protagoras, that man is

the measure of everything, was completely overwhelmed by theological sophistries which subordinated human relations to the metaphysical laws of a teleological moral order of the Universe.

The Renaissance rescued man from the depth of his degradation. Both Liberalism and Democracy are believed to be products of the humanist and individualist spirit of the Renaissance. The modern striving for democratic freedom inspired by those doctrines and ideals, began with the Renaissance. Man was to come to his own. Rescued from spiritual degradation, he was to attain temporal power in pursuit of the blessings of good life.

After two hundred years of bitter struggle, democratic governments were established in some countries. The French Revolution proclaimed the sovereignty of the people. The theoretical foundation of the Ideal State had been laid by its prophet in *Social Contract*. Since the French Revolution, one country after another shared the blessings of the Ideal State in which the sovereign power belonged to the people.

The parliamentary State was the Ideal State. People freely elected their law-givers and the Government was responsible to the elected representatives of the people. Human ingenuity could not possibly devise a political organisation more suitable for the hoary purpose of practising justice,—bringing good life on this earth within the reach of all mortal men. The Ideal State having been established, there was no room for further political progress; political thought could only be an apologia for the established order of things.

Experience, however, belied beautiful theories and blasted high hopes. If democracy means government of the people and by the people, the democratic experiment has been a dismal failure. Modern democratic governments are neither governments of the people nor by the people ; they are governments for the people which means the people are not ruled themselves, and therefore, parliamentary governments are not democratic governments.

Is democratic government, then, at all possible? Is not democracy an impractical proposition? The democratic experiment during the last two hundred years has raised these challenging questions. The failure to answer them, not theoretically, but in practice, precipitated a crisis which nearly engulfed modern civilisation. The failure fostered Fascism; which took up the challenge of experience, and answered the questions brazenly in the negative.

The victory over the Axis powers will not solve the crisis of democracy. Democracy will survive the crisis by overcoming its own contradictions. For that purpose, the fundamental problems of democratic practice must be laid bare.

Democracy and Liberalism are not identical, although they are usually confounded. Indeed, Liberalism, with its doubtless excellence, applied to political doctrine, is essentially the antithesis of democracy. Critical historians are still to show to what extent Liberalism was responsible for the crisis of democracy, which gave birth to Fascism. On the other hand, philosophically Liberalism is the antithesis of its own political implications; the liberal doctrine of *laissez faire*, consistently practised, leads to anarchism. The Liberal State can call itself the Ideal State only by denying any political organisation of society. Since Liberalism is too sober even to dream of such extravagance, its liberating philosophical implications were stultified by its political doctrines and economic dogmas.

Democracy is not possible under the banner of Liberalism. The history of the last two hundred years put Liberalism to the test. Democracy has not yet been practised. In the so-called democratic age, democracy was confounded with Liberalism. That confusion must be ended.

How to divorce democratic practice from liberal dogmas, at the same time retaining the liberating traditions of Liberalism? That is the fundamental problem of Democracy.

Liberalism, with its doctrine of *laissez faire* and free enterprise, had operated as a solvent of the stratified feudal society which not only denied political freedom to the masses of people, but cramped the entire economic life by all sorts of restrictions. Individualism and Humanism were liberating doctrines. But as the philosophy of the new bourgeois social order Liberalism made a mere formality of Democracy.

Liberalism reduced all democratic rights to equality before law; but at the same time, it upheld social inequality within the framework of the "free" bourgeois society. The Third Estate was freed from feudal domination, and the liberal theoretician of the French Constituent Assembly, Abbe Sieyes, identified the nation with the Third Estate. Manufacturers, traders, artisans, peasants and workers

constituting the Third Estate, all suffered under feudal tyranny. They united to overthrow the common enemy. But the Third Estate itself was not a homogeneous whole.

It is one thing to proclaim liberty and equality as rights; it is entirely different to establish them as facts. The social inequality within the Third Estate mocked at the empty formality of equality before law. Liberty became the freedom of opportunity to get rich. It could be available only to those who had the opportunity.

The fundamental problem of democratic practice, therefore, is : Can political equality be real in the midst of economic inequality? Can the formal equality before law eliminate the actual inequalities of social life?

The revolutionary experience in France as well as the evolutionary process in Britain compels a negative answer, which is corroborated by the experience of all other countries, including the great Transatlantic Democracy.

Supposing that equality before law is not a mere formality, there still remains the question : Who makes the law? Since the sovereignty of the people had been ceremoniously proclaimed, nearly a century lapsed before universal suffrage was established in all the democratic countries. The United States of America was the only exception, but there the all-powerful Senate was composed of less than a hundred hand-picked men, all dyed-in-the-wool Conservatives.

In the rest of the democratic world, Parliaments were elected by propertied minorities. The Mother of Parliaments was no exception. Laws made by the representatives of vested interests could not offer any protection to all. That was not humanly possible. Parliaments were not composed of Plato's philosophers. So, for Democracy, equality before law actually became the charter of social inequality.

The position did not improve substantially even after the establishment of universal suffrage. Until the beginning of the present century, Parliaments were packed with people belonging to the upper classes. Formally, the voters might or might not elect them, although they had little choice. However, once elected, the legislators could give any law they wished. The sovereign people had absolutely nothing to say in the making of the laws which they must obey. They were completely at the mercy of the legislators, who could not be in any way controlled by the electorate.

Further, once the laws were made, they became permanent features of the Statute Book which was sacrosanct. The sovereign people may have nominal right to change all laws including the fundamental law (Constitution). But they have precious little chance to do so. Any change in social relations, if at all necessary, must be brought about constitutionally. But the parliamentary procedure left very little power to the people to bring about any revision of the Constitution. The machinery of the State was controlled by people who had stakes in the established social order. So, for all practical purposes, parliamentary Democratic government became a dictatorship *for* the Demos.

On the other hand, the doctrines of *laissez faire* and free enterprise gave legal sanction to activities which enabled a few to control the economic life of the country. "Possession is nine points of law", is not an empty saying. One need not be an economic determinist to see that those who control the economic life of a country are in a position to dominate all the branches of public life.

Voters belonging to the lower strata of society may not always be compelled to vote for this or that man, though they often are. Compulsion operates in various ways. The voters belonging to the lower strata always labour under innumerable handicaps inherent in their social and legal position. Consequently, even the freedom of putting a slip of paper in the ballot box once in several years is not fully available to the bulk of democracy.

All these innumerable difficulties of democratic practice and deficiencies of parliamentary democracy can be traced back to one fundamental cause, namely, absence of social democracy, even to the smallest extent. The practice of parliamentary democracy began in an atmosphere of social inequality; there was no equality of opportunity, when the doctrine of equality before law was proclaimed. In the race for liberty and equality, declared as rights, a majority of the people started with a handicap. A minority had all the advantages. Freedom of enterprise could be utilised only by those who had the necessary assets to be enterprising. Consequently, under the parliamentary democracy of the bourgeois society, Liberalism enabled the rich to become richer, and morally justified their doing so. Though the poor did not always and everywhere

actually grow poorer, they lagged behind more and more in the race. Liberty and equality, proclaimed as inalienable rights, were actually placed beyond the reach of democracy. The rights could not be alienated simply because the people did not possess them.

These are well-known facts of world-wide experience. Perhaps they were unavoidable in the earlier stages of the democratic experiment. They can no longer be ignored if democracy is not to be discredited beyond redemption. It must be admitted that parliamentarism does not represent the attainment of the Ideal State. It was an advance towards the ideal. But the ideal is still far off, perhaps never to be reached. The march, however, must continue. What is the use of having the ideal of freedom if it is not possible for humanity to come nearer and nearer to it? The Demos must now be freed from economic disabilities if a further advance is to be made towards the ideal of freedom.